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Abstract
We prove that the bisimulation-invariant fragment of weak monadic second-order logic
(WMSO) is equivalent to the fragment of the modal µ-calculus where the application of
the least fixpoint operator µp.ϕ is restricted to formulas ϕ that are continuous in p. Our
proof is automata-theoretic in nature; in particular, we introduce a class of automata
characterizing the expressive power of WMSO over tree models of arbitrary branching
degree. The transition map of these automata is defined in terms of a logic FOE∞
1
that
is the extension of first-order logic with a generalized quantifier ∃∞, where ∃∞x.ϕ means
that there are infinitely many objects satisfying ϕ. An important part of our work consists
of a model-theoretic analysis of FOE∞
1
.
1 Introduction
Expressiveness modulo bisimilarity. This paper concerns the relative expressive power
of some languages used for describing properties of pointed labelled transitions systems, or
Kripke models. The interest in such expressiveness questions stems from applications where
these structures model computational processes, and bisimilar pointed structures represent
the same process. Seen from this perspective, properties of transition structures are relevant
only if they are invariant under bisimilarity. This explains the importance of bisimulation
invariance results of the form
M ≡ L/↔ (over K)
∗Emails: fcarreiro@dc.uba.ar, facchini@mimuw.edu.pl, y.venema@uva.nl, fabio.zanasi@ens-lyon.fr.
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stating that, if one restricts attention to a certain classK of transition structures, one language
M is expressively complete with respect to the relevant (i.e., bisimulation-invariant) properties
that can be formulated in another language L. In this setting, generally L is some rich
yardstick formalism such as first-order or monadic second-order logic, and M is some modal-
style fragment of L, usually displaying much better computational behavior than the full
language L.
A seminal result in the theory of modal logic is van Benthem’s Characterization Theo-
rem [20], stating that every bisimulation-invariant first-order formula α(x) is actually equiv-
alent to (the standard translation of) a modal formula:
ML ≡ FO/↔ (over the class of all LTSs).
Over the years, a wealth of variants of the Characterization Theorem have been obtained.
For instance, Rosen proved that van Benthem’s theorem is one of the few preservation results
that transfers to the setting of finite models [17]; for a recent, rich source of van Benthem-
style characterization results, see Dawar & Otto [2]. In this paper we are mainly interested
is the work of Janin & Walukiewicz [9], who extended van Benthem’s result to the setting
of fixpoint logics, by proving that the modal µ-calculus (µML) is the bisimulation-invariant
fragment of monadic second-order logic (MSO):
µML ≡ MSO/↔ (over the class of all LTSs).
Bisimulation invariance for WMSO. The yardstick logic that we consider in this paper
is weak monadic second-order logic (WMSO), a variant of monadic second-order logic where
the second-order quantifiers range over finite subsets of the transition structure rather than
over arbitrary ones. Our target will be to identify the bisimulation-invariant fragment of this
logic WMSO.
Before moving on, we should stress the role of the ambient class K in bisimulation-
invariance results. Of particular importance in the setting of weak monadic second-order logic
is the difference between structures of finite versus arbitrary branching degree. In the case
of finitely branching models, it is not very hard to show that WMSO is a (proper) fragment
of MSO, and it seems to be folklore that WMSO/↔ corresponds to AFMC, the alternation-
free fragment of the modal µ-calculus. For binary trees, this result was proved by Arnold
& Niwin´ski in [1]. In the case of structures of arbitrary branching degree, however, WMSO
and MSO have incomparable expressive power. The fact that, in particular, WMSO does not
correspond to a fragment of MSO, is witnessed by the class of infinitely branching structures,
which is clearly WMSO-definable, cannot be defined in MSO, since every MSO-definable
class of trees contains a finitely branching tree.1 For this reason, the relative expressive
power of WMSO/↔ and MSO/↔ is not a priori clear. However, it is reasonable to think
that WMSO/↔ is strictly weaker than AFMC: the class of well-founded trees, which is
definable in AFMC by the simple formula µp.✷p, is not definable in WMSO.2 Incidentally,
1As remarked in [18], this follows from the automata characterization of MSO given in [23].
2This follows from the fact that WMSO can only define properties of trees that, from a topological point
of view, are Borel, which is not the case of the class of trees defined by µp.✷p— see e.g. [18].
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the question whether, conversely, there is a natural logic of which the bisimulation-invariant
fragment corresponds to AFMC was answered positively by three of the present authors
in [5], where they introduced another variant of MSO, called well-founded MSO (WFMSO),
and proved that WFMSO/↔ ≡ AFMC (over the class of all LTSs).
The main result that we shall prove in this paper states that the bisimulation-invariant
fragment of WMSO is equivalent to a certain, fragment µcML of the modal µ-calculus.
µcML ≡WMSO/↔ (over the class of all LTSs). (1)
This fragment µcML, which is strictly weaker than the alternation-free fragment of µML, is
characterized by a certain restriction on the application of fixpoint operators, which involves
the notion of (Scott) continuity.
Continuity, an interesting property that features naturally in the semantics of many (fix-
point) logics, in fact plays a key role throughout this paper. For its definition, we consider
how the meaning [[ϕ]]T ⊆ T of a formula ϕ in some structure T (with domain T ) depends on
the meaning of a fixed proposition letter or monadic predicate symbol p. This dependence
can be formalized as a map ϕTp : ℘(T )→ ℘(T ), and if this map satisfies the condition
ϕTp (X) =
⋃{
ϕTa (X
′) | X ′ is a finite subset of X
}
, (2)
we say that ϕ is continuous in p. The topological terminology stems from the observation
that (2) expresses the continuity of the map ϕTp with respect to the Scott topology on ℘(T ).
If we look at concrete cases, this definition can be given a different reading: if ϕ is a formula
of the modal µ-calculus, (2) means that ϕ holds at some state s of T iff we can shrink the
interpretation of the proposition letter p to some finite subset of the original interpretation,
in such a way that ϕ holds at s in the modified version of T.
A syntactic characterization of this property for the modal µ-calculus was obtained by
Fontaine [6, 7], and the definition of our fragment µcML uses this characterization as follows:
whereas in the full language of µML the only syntactic condition on the formation of a formula
µp.ϕ is that ϕ is positive in p, for the fragment µcML this condition is strengthened to the
requirement that ϕ is (syntactically) continuous in p. More precisely, the fragment µcML is
defined as follows:
Definition 1.1 For each set Q of proposition letters, the fragment µMLCQ of µML which is
continuous in Q is given by the simultaneous induction
ϕ ::= q | ψ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ✸ϕ | µp.α
where p ∈ P, q ∈ Q, ψ is a Q-free µML-formula, and α ∈ µMLCQ∪{p}. The formulas of the
fragment µcML are then given by the following induction:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ✸ϕ | µp.α
where p ∈ P, and α ∈ µMLCp.
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In fact we will prove, analogous to the result by Janin & Walukiewicz, the following strong
version of the characterization result (1), which provides an explicit translation, mapping any
bisimulation-invariant formula ϕ in WMSO to an equivalent formula ϕ• in µcML.
Theorem 1.2 There are effective translations (−)• : WMSO → µcML and (−)• : µcML →
WMSO such that
1. A formula ϕ of WMSO is bisimulation invariant if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ•, and
2. ψ ≡ ψ• for every formula ψ ∈ µcML.
To see how this theorem implies (1), observe that part (i) shows that WMSO/↔ ≤ µcML.
Part (ii) states that µcML ≤ WMSO, so combined with the fact that every formula in
µcML ⊆ µML is bisimulation invariant, this gives the converse, µcML ≤WMSO/↔.
Automata for WMSO. As usual in this research area, our proof will be automata-theoretic
in nature. More specifically, as the second main contribution of this paper, we introduce a
new class of parity automata that exactly captures the expressive power of WMSO over the
class of tree models of arbitrary branching degree.
Before we turn to a description of these automata, we first have a look at the automata,
introduced by Walukiewicz [23], corresponding to MSO (over tree models). Fixing the set of
proposition letters of our models as P, we think of ℘(P) as an alphabet or set of colors. We can
then define an MSO-automaton as a tuple A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉, where A is a finite set of states,
aI an initial state, and Ω : A→ N is a parity function. The transition function ∆ maps a pair
(a, c) ∈ A×℘(P) to a sentence in the first-order language (with equality) FOE1(A), of which
the state space A provides the set of (monadic) predicates. For a more precise definition, let
FOE+1 (A) denote the set of those sentences in FOE1(A) where all predicates in A occur only
positively; we require that ∆ : A× ℘(P)→ FOE+1 (A).
We shall refer to FOE1 as the one-step language of MSO-automata, and denote the class
of MSO-automata with Aut(FOE1). The automata that we consider in this article run on
labelled transition systems and decide wether to accept or reject them. To take such decision
we associate an acceptance game for an MSO-automaton A and a transition system T. A
match of this game consists of two players, ∃ and ∀, moving a token from one position to
another. When such a match arrives at a so-called basic position, i.e., a position of the form
(a, t) ∈ A× T , the players consider the sentence ∆(a, ct) ∈ FOE
+
1 (A), where ct ∈ ℘(P) is the
color of t (that is, the set of proposition letters true at t). At this position ∃ has to turn
the set R[t] of successors of s into a model for the formula ∆(a, ct) by coming up with an
interpretation I of the monadic predicates a ∈ A as subsets of R[s], so that the resulting
first-order structure (R[s], I) makes the formula ∆(a, ct) true.
Walukiewicz’s key result linking MSO to Aut(FOE1) states that
MSO ≡ Aut(FOE1) (over tree models), (3)
and the proof of this result proceeds by inductively showing that every formula ϕ in MSO can
be effectively transformed into an equivalent automaton Aϕ ∈ Aut(FOE1). For the details of
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this construction, a fairly intricate analysis of the one-step logic FOE1 is required, crucially
involving various normal forms of the sentences of FOE1(A).
In order to adapt this approach to the setting of WMSO, observe that by Ko¨nig’s lemma,
a subset of a tree T is finite iff it is both a subset of a finitely branching subtree of T and
noetherian, that is, a subset of a subtree of T that has no infinite branches. This suggests that
we may change the definition of MSO-automata into one of WMSO-automata via two kinds
of modifications, roughly speaking corresponding to a horizontal and a vertical ‘dimension’
of trees.
For the ‘vertical modification’ we may turn to the literature on weak automata [14]. The
acceptance condition Ω of a parity automaton A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 is weak if Ω(a) = Ω(a
′)
whenever the states a and a′ belong to the same strongly connected component (SCC) of the
automaton. To see that the notion of connected component is well-defined observe that for
A we can associate a directed graph on A such that a, b ∈ A are connected iff b occurs in
∆(a, c) for some c ∈ ℘(P). Let Autw(FOE1) denote the set of MSO-automata with a weak
parity condition. It was proved in [24] (see also [5]) that
WFMSO ≡ Autw(FOE1) (over the class of all trees),
with WFMSO denoting the earlier mentioned variant of MSO where second-order quantifica-
tion is restricted to noetherian subsets of trees. From this it easily follows that
WMSO ≡ Autw(FOE1) (over the class of finitely branching trees),
since the noetherian subsets of a finitely branching trees correspond to the finite ones.
Over the class of all tree models, however, WMSO is not equivalent to Autw(FOE1), as
is witnessesed by the earlier mentioned class of well-founded trees, which can be defined in
AFMC ≤WFMSO, but not in WMSO.
The hurdle to take, in order to find automata for WMSO on trees of arbitrary branching
degree, concerns the horizontal dimension; the main problem lies in finding the right one-
step language for WMSO-automata. An obvious candidate for this language would be weak
monadic second-order logic itself, or more precisely, its variant WMSO1 over the signature
of monadic predicates (corresponding to the automata states). A very helpful observation,
made by Va¨a¨na¨nen [19], states that
WMSO1 ≡ FOE
∞
1 ,
where FOE∞1 is the extension of FOE1 with the generalized quantifier ∃
∞, where ∃∞x.ϕmean-
ing that there are infinitely many objects satisfying ϕ. Taking the full language of WMSO1 or
FOE∞1 as our one-step language would give too much expressive power: since FOE
∞
1 extends
FOE1, we would find that, over tree models, Autw(FOE
∞
1 ) extends Autw(FOE1), whereas we
already saw that Autw(FOE1) ≡WFMSO is incomparable to WMSO. It is here that we will
crucially involve the notion of continuity. The automata corresponding to WMSO will be of
the form A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉, where the transition map ∆ : A× ℘(P)→ FOE
∞
1
+(A) is subject
to the following two constraints, for all a, a′ ∈ A belonging to the same strongly connected
component of A:
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(weakness) Ω(a) = Ω(a′), and
(continuity) if Ω(a) is odd (resp. even), then for each colour c ∈ ℘(P), ∆(a, c) is continuous
(resp. co-continuous) in a′,
where co-continuity is a dual notion to continuity. The class of these automata is denoted by
Autcw(FOE
∞
1 ). Consequently, for a proper definition of these automata we need a syntactic
characterization of the FOE∞1 (A)-sentences that are (co-)continuous in one (or more) monadic
predicates of A.
For this purpose, we conduct a fairly detailed model-theoretic study of the logic FOE∞1
which we consider to be the third main contribution of our work. Similar to the results for
FOE1, we provide normal forms for the sentences of FOE
∞
1 (A), and syntactic characterizations
of the fragments whose sentences are monotone (respectively continuous) in some monadic
predicate a ∈ A.
To finish, we give constructions transforming WMSO-formulas to WMSO-automata and
vice-versa, witnessing that
WMSO ≡ Autcw(FOE
∞
1 ) (over tree models). (4)
Proof of main result. To conclude our introduction we briefly sketch the proof of our
main result, Theorem 1.2(1). Roughly speaking, we follow the bisimulation-invariance proof
by Janin &Walukiewicz, which revolves around relating two distinct types of automata, which
correspond, respectively, to the logics MSO and µML. More precisely, these two automaton
types are given as Aut(FOE1) and Aut(FO1), where the one-step languages are first-order
logic respectively with and without equality. What we will add to their proof is the insight
from [21] that the required relation between Aut(FOE1) and Aut(FO1) already follows from
results relating the respective one-step languages.
In our setting, we need to identify automata corresponding to the fragment µcML. For
this purpose we introduce the class Autcw(FO1) consisting of those automata in Aut(FO1)
that satisfy similar weakness and continuity conditions as the ones in Autcw(FOE
∞
1 ):
µcML ≡ Autcw(FO1) (over the class of all LTSs). (5)
As the key step in our proof then, we will provide a translation (−)• : FOE∞1 → FO1 which
naturally induces a transformation (−)• : Autcw(FOE
∞
1 ) → Autcw(FO1). As a consequence
of the nice model-theoretic properties of the translation at the one-step level, the automaton
transformation satisfies, for all transition systems T:
A
• accepts T iff A accepts Tω (6)
where Tω is the ω-unravelling of T. It easily follows from (6) that a WMSO-automaton A is
bisimulation invariant iff A ≡ A•, and so Theorem 1.2(1) follows by (4) and (5).
Overview of paper. In the next section we give a precise definition of the preliminaries
required to understand this article. In Section 3 we define the one-step logics that will
be used through the paper and give normal forms and syntactic characterizations of their
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monotone and (co-)continuous fragments. In Section 4 we formally define WMSO-automata
and show that from every WMSO-formula we can construct an equivalent WMSO-automaton.
In Section 5 we prove the converse, that is, for every WMSO-automaton we can construct an
equivalent WMSO-formula, this finishes the automata characterization of WMSO over tree
models. Finally, in Section 6 we prove the main result of the paper, namely that the fragment
µcML is the bisimulation-invariant fragment of WMSO.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Transition systems and trees
Throughout this article we fix a set P of elements that will be called proposition letters and
denoted with small Latin letters p, q, . . . . We denote with C the set ℘(P) of labels on P; it
will be convenient to think of C as an alphabet. Given a binary relation R ⊆ X × Y , for
any element x ∈ X, we indicate with R[x] the set {y ∈ Y | (x, y) ∈ R} while R+ and R∗
are defined respectively as the transitive closure of R and the reflexive and transitive closure
of R. The set Ran(R) is defined as
⋃
x∈X R[x].
A C-labeled transition system (LTS) is a tuple T = 〈T,R, σ, sI〉 where T is the universe
or domain of T, σ : T → ℘(P) is a marking, R ⊆ T 2 is the accessibility relation and sI ∈ T
is a distinguished node. We use |T| to denote the domain of T. Observe that the marking
σ : T → ℘(P) can be seen as a valuation σ♭ : P→ ℘(T ) given by σ♭(p) = {s ∈ T | p ∈ σ(s)}.
A C-tree is a LTS in which every node can be reached from sI , and every node except sI
has a unique predecessor; the distinguished node sI is called the root of T. Each node s ∈ T
uniquely defines a subtree of T with carrier R∗[s] and root s. We denote this subtree by T.s.
We use the term tree language as a synonym of class of C-trees.
The tree unravelling of an LTS T is given by Te := 〈TP , RP , σ
′, sI〉 where TP is the set of
finite paths in T stemming from sI , RP (t, t
′) iff t′ is an extension of t and the color of a path
t ∈ TP is given by the color of its last node in T . The ω-unravelling T
ω of T is an unravelling
which has ω-many copies of each node different from the root.
A p-variant of a transition system T = 〈T,R, σ, sI〉 is a ℘(P ∪ {p})-transition system
〈T,R, σ′, sI〉 such that σ
′(s) \ {p} = σ(s) for all s ∈ T . Given a set S ⊆ T , we let T[p 7→ S]
denote the p-variant where p ∈ σ′(s) iff s ∈ S.
Let ϕ ∈ L be a formula of some logic L, we use JϕK = {T | T |= ϕ} to denote the class of
transition systems that make ϕ true. A class K of transition systems is said to be L-definable
if there is a formula ϕ ∈ L such that JϕK = K. We use the notation ϕ ≡ ψ to mean that
JϕK = JψK and given two logics L,L′ we use L ≡ L′ when the L-definable and L′-definable
classes of models coincide.
Convention. Throughout this paper, we will only consider transition systems T in which
R[s] is non-empty for every node s ∈ T . In particular this means that every tree we consider
is leafless. All our results, however, can easily be lifted to the general case.
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2.2 Games
We introduce some terminology and background on infinite games. All the games that we
consider involve two players called E´loise (∃) and Abelard (∀). In some contexts we refer to
a player Π to specify a a generic player in {∃,∀}. Given a set A, by A∗ and Aω we denote
respectively the set of words (finite sequences) and streams (or infinite words) over A.
A board game G is a tuple (G∃, G∀, E,Win), where G∃ and G∀ are disjoint sets whose
union G = G∃ ∪ G∀ is called the board of G, E ⊆ G × G is a binary relation encoding the
admissible moves, and Win ⊆ Gω is a winning condition. An initialized board game G@uI is
a tuple (G∃, G∀, uI , E,Win) where uI ∈ G is the initial position of the game. When Win is
given by a parity function Ω : G → ω we say that G is a parity game and sometimes simply
write G = (G∃, G∀, E,Ω).
Given a board game G, a match of G is simply a path through the graph (G,E); that
is, a sequence π = (ui)i<α of elements of G, where α is either ω or a natural number, and
(ui, ui+1) ∈ E for all i with i + 1 < α. A match of G@uI is supposed to start at uI . Given
a finite match π = (ui)i<k for some k < ω, we call last(π) := uk−1 the last position of the
match; the player Π such that last(π) ∈ GΠ is supposed to move at this position, and if
E[last(π)] = ∅, we say that Π got stuck in π. A match π is called total if it is either finite,
with one of the two players getting stuck, or infinite. Matches that are not total are called
partial. Any total match π is won by one of the players: If π is finite, then it is won by the
opponent of the player who gets stuck. Otherwise, if π is infinite, the winner is ∃ if π ∈Win,
and ∀ if π 6∈Win.
Given a board game G and a player Π, let PMGΠ denote the set of partial matches of
G whose last position belongs to player Π. A strategy for Π is a function f : PMGΠ → G.
A match π = (ui)i<α of G is f -guided if for each i < α such that ui ∈ GΠ we have that
ui+1 = f(u0, . . . , ui). Let u ∈ G and a f be a strategy for Π. We say that f is a surviving
strategy for Π in G@u if
(i) For each f -guided partial match π of G@u, if last(π) is in GΠ then f(π) is legitimate,
that is, (last(π), f(π)) ∈ E.
We say that f is a winning strategy for Π in G@u if, additionally,
(ii) Π wins each f -guided total match of G@u.
If Π has a winning winning strategy for G@u then u is called a winning position for Π in G.
The set of positions of G that are winning for Π is denoted by WinΠ(G). A strategy f is called
positional if f(π) = f(π′) for each π, π′ ∈ Dom(f) with last(π) = last(π′). A board game
G with board G is determined if G = Win∃(G) ∪Win∀(G), that is, each u ∈ G is a winning
position for one of the two players.
Fact 2.1 (Positional Determinacy of Parity Games [4, 13]) For each parity game G,
there are positional strategies f∃ and f∀ respectively for player ∃ and ∀, such that for every
position u ∈ G there is a player Π such that fΠ is a winning strategy for Π in G@u.
From now on, we always assume that each strategy we work with in parity games is positional.
Moreover, we think of a positional strategy fΠ for player Π as a function fΠ : GΠ → G.
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2.3 Parity automata
We recall the definition of a parity automaton, adapted to our setting. Since we will be
comparing parity automata defined in terms of various one-step languages, it makes sense to
make the following abstraction.
Definition 2.2 Given a set A, we define an A-structure to be a pair (D,V ) consisting of a
domain D and a valuation V : A→ ℘D. Depending on context, elements of A will be called
monadic predicates or propositional variables.
A one-step language is a map L1 assigning to each set A a set L1(A) of objects called
one-step formulas over A. We require that L1(
⋂
iAi) =
⋂
i L1(Ai), so that for each ϕ ∈ L1(A)
there is a smallest Aϕ ⊆ A such that ϕ ∈ L1(Aϕ); this Aϕ is the set of propositional variables
that occur in ϕ.
We assume that such a one-step language L1 comes with a truth relation: given an A-
structure (D,V ), a formula ϕ ∈ L1 is either true or false in (D,V ), denoted by, respectively,
(D,V ) |= ϕ and (D,V ) 6|= ϕ. We also assume that L1 has a positive fragment L
+
1 character-
izing monotonicity in the sense that a formula ϕ ∈ L1(A) is (semantically) monotone iff it is
equivalent to a formula ϕ′ ∈ L+1 (A).
The one-step languages L1 featuring in this paper all are induced by well-known logics.
Examples include first-order logic (with and without equality), first-order logic extended with
the infinity quantifier, and fragments of these languages.
Definition 2.3 Let L1 be some one-step language. A parity automaton based on L1 and
alphabet C is a tuple A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 such that A is a finite set of states of the automaton,
aI ∈ A is the initial state, ∆ : A× C → L
+
1 (A) is the transition map, and Ω : A → N is the
parity map. The collection of such automata will be denoted by Aut(L1).
Acceptance and rejection of a transition system by an automaton is defined in terms of
the following parity game.
Definition 2.4 Given A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI 〉 in Aut(L1) and a transition system T = 〈T,R, σ, sI〉,
the acceptance game A(A,T) of A on T is the parity game defined according to the rules of
the following table.
Position Player Admissible moves Parity
(a, s) ∈ A× T ∃ {V : A→ ℘(R[s]) | (R[s], V ) |= ∆(a, σ(s))} Ω(a)
V : A→ ℘(T ) ∀ {(b, t) | t ∈ V (b)} max(Ω[A])
A transition system T is accepted by A if ∃ has a winning strategy in A(A,T)@(aI , sI),
and rejected if (aI , sI) is a winning position for ∀.
Many properties of parity automata are determined at the one-step level. An important
example concerns the notion of complementation.
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Definition 2.5 Two one-step formulas ϕ and ψ are each other’s Boolean dual if for every
structure (D,V ) we have
(D,V ) |= ϕ iff (D,V c) 6|= ψ,
where V c is the valuation given by V c(a) := D \ V (a), for all a. A one-step language L1 is
closed under Boolean duals if for every set A, each formula ϕ ∈ L1(A) has a Boolean dual
ϕδ ∈ L1(A).
Following ideas by [10], we can use Boolean duals, together with a role switch between ∀
and ∃, in order to define a negation or complementation operation on automata.
Definition 2.6 Assume that, for some one-step language L1, the map (−)
δ provides, for each
set A, a Boolean dual ϕδ ∈ L1(A) for each ϕ ∈ L1(A). Given A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 in Aut(L1)
we define its complement A as the automaton 〈A,∆δ ,Ωδ, aI〉, where ∆
δ(a, c) := (∆(a, c))δ ,
and Ωδ(a) := 1 + Ω(a), for all a ∈ A and c ∈ C.
Proposition 2.7 Let L1 and (−)
δ be as in the previous definition. For each automaton
A ∈ Aut(L1) and each transition structure T we have that
A accepts T iff A rejects T.
The proof of Proposition 2.7 is based on the fact that the power of ∃ in A(A,T) is the
same as that of ∀ in A(A,T).
As an immediate consequence of this proposition, one may show that if the one-step
language L1 is closed under Boolean duals, then the class Aut(L1) is closed under taking
complementation. Further on we will use Proposition 2.7 to show that the same may apply
to some subsets of Aut(L1).
2.4 Weak monadic second-order logic
Definition 2.8 The weak monadic second-order logic on a set of predicates P is given by
ϕ ::= ⇓p | p ⊑ q | R(p, q) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃p.ϕ
where p, q ∈ P. We denote this logic by WMSO(P) and omit P when the set of proposition
letters is clear from context. We adopt the standard convention that no letter is both free
and bound in ϕ.
Definition 2.9 Let T = 〈T,R, σ, sI〉 be a LTS, the semantics of WMSO is defined as follows
T |= ⇓p iff σ♭(p) = {sI}
T |= p ⊑ q iff σ♭(p) ⊆ σ♭(q)
T |= R(p, q) iff for every s ∈ σ♭(p) there exists t ∈ σ♭(q) such that sRt
T |= ¬ϕ iff T 6|= ϕ
T |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff T |= ϕ or T |= ψ
T |= ∃p.ϕ iff there is a finite set X ⊆ω T such that T[p 7→ X] |= ϕ
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Remark 2.10 The reader may have expected a more standard two-sorted language for
second-order logic, for example given by
ϕ ::= p(x) | R(x, y) | x ≈ y | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ∃p.ϕ
where p ∈ P, x, y ∈ iVar (individual variables), and ≈ is the symbol for equality. Both
definitions can be proved to be equivalent, however, we choose to keep Definition 2.9 as it
will be better suited to work with in the context of automata. ✁
2.5 First-order logic with generalized quantifiers
In this subsection we introduce an extension of first-order logic with so called generalized
quantifiers. Our interest in this extension stems from the fact that it will allow us to define a
variant of first-order logic that is expressively equivalent to weak monadic second order (see
Section 3) and has nice technical features such as a normal form theorem.
Mostowski [12] defined (unary) generalized quantifiers as follows: a (unary) generalized
quantifier Q is a collection of pairs (J,X) with X ⊆ J , and satisfying the following condition
If
(
(J,X) ∈ Q, |X| = |Y | ∧ |J \X| = |K \ Y |
)
then (K,Y ) ∈ Q.
The semantics of Q is defined by the following condition
T |= Qx.ϕ(x, #–s ) iff (T, {t | T |= ϕ(t, #–s )}) ∈ Q.
where we use #–s := [s1, . . . , sn] to denote sequences or vectors of elements.
For the rest of this article we will focus on the generalized quantifier ∃∞ expressing that
there exist infinitely many elements satisfying a certain condition. Formally, it is defined as
∃∞ := {(J,X) | |X| ≥ ℵ0}.
The dual of ∃∞ is ∀∞ = {(J,X) | |J \X| < ℵ0}. It is worth observing what is the intended
meaning of this quantifier: ∀∞x.ϕ expresses that there are at most finitely many elements
falsifying the formula ϕ. The extension of first-order logic with equality (FOE) or without
equality (FO) obtained by adding ∃∞ to the corresponding first-order language is denoted
respectively by FO∞ and FOE∞.
2.6 The Modal µ-Calculus.
The language of the modal µ-calculus (µML) on P is given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= q | ¬q | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ✸ϕ | ✷ϕ | µp.ϕ | νp.ϕ
where p, q ∈ P and p is positive in ϕ (i.e., p is not negated). We use the standard convention
that no variable is both free and bound in a formula and that every bound variable is fresh.
Let p be a bound variable occuring in some formula ϕ ∈ µML, we use δp to denote the binding
definition of p, that is, the formula such that either µp.δp or νp.δp are subformulas of ϕ.
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The semantics of this language is completely standard. Let T = 〈T,R, σ, sI〉 be a transition
system and ϕ ∈ µML. We inductively define the meaning JϕKT which includes the following
clauses for the least (µ) and greatest (ν) fixpoint operators:
Jµx.ψKT :=
⋂
{S ⊆ T | S ⊇ JψKT[x 7→S]}
Jνx.ψKT :=
⋃
{S ⊆ T | S ⊆ JψKT[x 7→S]}
We say that ϕ is true in T (notation T  ϕ) iff sI ∈ JϕK
T.
We will now describe the semantics defined above in game-theoretic terms. That is, we
will define the evaluation game E(ϕ,T) associated with a formula ϕ ∈ µML and a transition
system T. This game is played by two players (∃ and ∀) moving through positions (ξ, s) where
ξ is a subformula of ϕ and s ∈ T . In an arbitrary position (ξ, s) it is useful to think of ∃
Position Player Admissible moves
(ψ1 ∨ ψ2, s) ∃ {(ψ1, s), (ψ2, s)}
(ψ1 ∧ ψ2, s) ∀ {(ψ1, s), (ψ2, s)}
(✸ϕ, s) ∃ {(ϕ, t) | t ∈ R[s]}
(✷ϕ, s) ∀ {(ϕ, t) | t ∈ R[s]}
(µp.ϕ, s) − {(ϕ, s)}
(νp.ϕ, s) − {(ϕ, s)}
(p, s) with p bound in ϕ − {(δp, s)}
(¬q, s) ∈ P× T , q free in ϕ and q /∈ σ(s) ∀ ∅
(¬q, s) ∈ P× T , q free in ϕ and q ∈ σ(s) ∃ ∅
(q, s) ∈ P× T , q free in ϕ and q ∈ σ(s) ∀ ∅
(q, s) ∈ P× T , q free in ϕ and q /∈ σ(s) ∃ ∅
Table 1: Evaluation game for the modal µ-calculus
trying to show that ξ is true at s, and of ∀ of trying to convince her that ξ is false at s. The
rules of the evaluation game are given in Table 1. Every finite match of this game is lost by
the player that got stuck. To give a winning condition for an infinite match let p be, of the
bound variables of ϕ that get unravelled infinitely often, the one that is the highest in the
syntactic tree of ϕ. The winner of the match is ∀ if p is a µ-variable and ∃ if p is a ν-variable.
We say that ϕ is true in T iff ∃ has a winning strategy in E(ϕ,T).
Formulas of the modal µ-calculus are classified according to their alternation depth, which
roughly is given as the maximal length of a chain of nested alternating least and greatest
fixpoint operators [15]. The alternation-free fragment of the modal µ-calculus (AFMC) is the
collection of µML-formulas without nesting of least and greatest fixpoint operators.
Definition 2.11 Let ϕ be a formula of the modal µ-calculus. We say that ϕ ∈ AFMC iff for
all subformulas µp.ψ1 and νq.ψ2 we have that p is not free in ψ2 and q is not free in ψ1.
It is not difficult to see that, over arbitrary transition systems, this fragment is less
expressive than the whole µML. That is, there is a µML-formula ϕ such that JϕK is not
AFMC-definable [16].
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In order to properly define the fragment µcML ⊆ AFMC which is of critical importance
in this article, we are particularly interested in the continuous fragment of the modal µ-
calculus. As observed in Section 1, the abstract notion of continuity can be given a concrete
interpretation in the context of µ-calculus.
Definition 2.12 Let ϕ ∈ µML, and q be a propositional variable. We say that ϕ is contin-
uous in q iff for every transition system T there exists some finite S ⊆ω σ
♭(q) such that
T  ϕ iff T[q 7→ S]  ϕ.
We can give a syntactic characterization of the fragment of µML that captures this prop-
erty. Given a set Q of propositional variables, we define the fragment of µML continuous in
Q, denoted by µMLCQ, by induction in the following way
ϕ ::= q | ψ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ✸ϕ | µp.α
where q ∈ Q, p ∈ P \ Q, α ∈ µMLCQ∪{p}, and ψ is a Q-free µML-formula.
Proposition 2.13 ([6, 7]) A µML-formula is continuous in q iff it is equivalent to a formula
in the fragment µMLCq.
Finally, we define µcML to be the fragment of µML where the use of the least fixed point
operator is restricted to the continuous fragment. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 2.14 Formulas of the fragment µcML are given by the following induction:
ϕ ::= q | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ✸ϕ | µp.α
where p, q ∈ P, and α ∈ µMLCp.
Proposition 2.15 Let ϕ ∈ µcML, the following hold
(1) ϕ is an AFMC-formula,
(2) Every µ-variable in ϕ is existential (i.e., is only in the scope of diamonds), and dually
every ν-variable in ϕ is universal (i.e., is only in the scope of boxes).
Proof. Both points are proved by an easy induction on the complexity of a formula. For the
first one, it is enough to notice that if ϕ ∈ µMLCq∩AFMC, then µq.ϕ ∈ AFMC by definition
of µMLCq. qed
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.13 we have the following:
Corollary 2.16 For every µcML-formula µp.ϕ, ϕ is continuous in p.
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2.7 Bisimulation
Bisimulation is a notion of behavioral equivalence between processes. For the case of transition
systems, it is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.17 Let T = 〈T,R, σ, sI〉 and T
′ = 〈T ′, R′, σ′, s′I〉 be transition systems. A
bisimulation is a relation Z ⊆ T × T ′ such that for all (t, t′) ∈ Z the following holds:
(atom) p ∈ σ(t) iff p ∈ σ′(t′) for all p ∈ P;
(forth) for all s ∈ R[t] there is s′ ∈ R′[t′] such that (s, s′) ∈ Z;
(back) for all s′ ∈ R′[t′] there is s ∈ R[t] such that (s, s′) ∈ Z.
Two pointed transition systems T and T′ are bisimilar (denoted T ↔ T′) if there is a bisim-
ulation Z ⊆ T × T ′ containing (sI , s
′
I).
The following fact about tree unravellings will allow us to provide a proof of Theorem 1.2
by just proving it for tree languages.
Fact 2.18 T and Te are bisimilar, for every transition system T.
A class of transition systems K is bisimulation closed if T ↔ T′ implies that T ∈ K iff
T
′ ∈ K, for all T and T′. A formula ϕ ∈ L is bisimulation-invariant if T ↔ T′ implies that
T  ϕ iff T′  ϕ, for all T and T′.
Fact 2.19 Each µML-definable class of transition systems is bisimulation closed.
3 One-step logics, normal forms and continuity
Given a set of names A we use L1(A) to denote an arbitrary one-step language based on A.
One-step formulas are interpreted over unary (or one-step) models D = (D,V : A → ℘D).
We use M1(A) to denote the class of all one-step models based on the set of names A.
In this section we define the one-steps logics that we use in the rest of the article, namely:
one-step weak monadic second-order logic (WMSO1), one-step first-order logic with and with-
out equality (FOE1, FO1) and one-step first-order logic with the ∃
∞ quantifier (FOE∞1 ). The
main theorems of this section prove normal forms for these logics and give syntactical char-
acterizations of the monotonic and continuous fragments that we use in later sections.
Definition 3.1 Let iVar be a set of (individual) variables. Given a set of names A we define
the set WMSO1(A) of one-step weak monadic second-order formulas as the sentences given
by the following grammar
ϕ ::= a(x) | x ≈ y | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ∃a.ϕ
where x, y ∈ iVar, a ∈ A.
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Definition 3.2 The set FOE1(A) of one-step first-order sentences (with equality) is given by
the sentences formed by
ϕ ::= a(x) | x ≈ y | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ
where x, y ∈ iVar, a ∈ A. The one-step logic FO1(A) is as FOE1(A) but without equality. The
set FOE∞1 (A) of one-step first-order sentences with generalized quantifier ∃
∞ (with equality)
is defined analogously by just adding the clauses ∃∞x.ϕ and ∀∞x.ϕ.
Without loss of generality, from now on we always assume that every bounded variable
occurring in a sentence is bounded by an unique quantifier (generalized or not). Recall that
given a one-step logic L1 we write L
+
1 (A) to denote the fragment where every predicate a ∈ A
occurs only positively. The following observation will allow us to work with the (one-sorted)
language FOE1 instead of the (two-sorted) language WMSO1.
Fact 3.3 ([19]) WMSO1(A) ≡ FOE
∞
1 (A).
In the following subsections we provide a detailed model theoretic analysis of the one-step
logics that we use in this article, specifically, we give
• Normal forms for arbitrary formulas of FO1, FOE1 and FOE
∞
1 .
• Strong forms of syntactic characterizations for the monotone and continuous fragments
of several of the mentioned logics. Namely, for L1 ∈ {FO1,FOE1,FOE
∞
1 } we provide
(a) A fragment L1Ma and a translation (−)
◦ : L1(A)→ L1Ma(A) such that for every
ϕ ∈ L1 we have ϕ ≡ ϕ
◦ iff ϕ is monotone in a ∈ A,
for L1 ∈ {FO1,FOE
∞
1 } we provide
(b) A fragment L1Ca and a translation (−)
△ : L1(A) → L1Ca(A) such that for every
ϕ ∈ L1 we have ϕ ≡ ϕ
△ iff ϕ is continuous in a ∈ A.
Moreover, we show that the latter translation also restricts to the fragment L+1 , i.e.,
(c) The restriction (−)△+ : L
+
1 (A) → L
+
1 Ca(A) of (−)
△ is such that for every ϕ ∈ L+1
we have ϕ ≡ ϕ△+ iff ϕ is continuous in a ∈ A.
• Syntactic characterizations of the co-continuous fragments of FO1 and FOE
∞
1 .
• Normal forms for the monotone and continuous fragments.
3.1 Normal forms
Given a set of names A and S ⊆ A, we introduce the notation
τS(x) :=
∧
a∈S
a(x) ∧
∧
a∈A\S
¬a(x).
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The formula τS(x) is called an A-type, we usually blur the distinction between τS(x) and S
and call S an A-type as well. A positive A-type is defined as τ+S (x) :=
∧
a∈S a(x). We use
the convention that, if S is the empty set, then τ+S (x) is ⊤ and we call it an empty positive
A-type. Given a one-step model D we use |S|D to denote the number of elements that realize
the A-type τS in D. Formally, it is defined as |S|D := |{d ∈ |D| : D |= τS(d)}|.
A partial isomorphism between two one-step models D = (D,V ) and D′ = (D′, V ′) is a
partial function f : D → D′ which is injective and satisfies d ∈ V (a) ⇔ f(d) ∈ V ′(a) for all
a ∈ A and d ∈ Dom(f). Given two sequences [d1, . . . , dk] ∈ D
k and [d′1, . . . , d
′
k] ∈ D
′k we use
f : [d1, . . . , dk] 7→ [d
′
1, . . . , d
′
k] to denote the partial function f : D → D
′ defined as f(di) := d
′
i.
If there exist di, dj such that di = dj but d
′
i 6= d
′
j then the result is undefined.
Definition 3.4 The quantifier rank qr(ϕ) of ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 (hence also for FO1 and FOE1) is
defined as follows
• If ϕ is atomic qr(ϕ) = 0,
• If ϕ = ¬ψ then qr(ϕ) = qr(ψ),
• If ϕ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 or ϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 then qr(ϕ) = max{qr(ψ1), qr(ψ2)},
• If ϕ = Qx.ψ for Q ∈ {∃,∀,∃∞,∀∞} then qr(ϕ) = 1 + qr(ψ).
Given a one-step logic L1 we write D ≡
L
k D
′ to indicate that the one-step models D and D′
satisfy exactly the same formulas ϕ ∈ L1 with qr(ϕ) ≤ k. The logic L will be omitted when
it is clear from context.
3.1.1 Normal form for FO1
We start by stating a normal form for one-step first-order logic without equality. A formula
in basic form gives a complete description of the types that are satisfied in a one-step model.
Definition 3.5 A formula ϕ ∈ FO1(A) is in basic form if ϕ =
∨
∇FO(Σ) where each disjunct
is of the form
∇FO(Σ) =
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τS(x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ
τS(x)
for some set of types Σ ⊆ ℘A.
It is easy to prove, using Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games, that every formula of first-order logic
without equality over a unary signature (i.e., FO1) is equivalent to a formula in basic form.
Proof sketches can be found in [8, Lemma 16.23] and [21, Proposition 4.14]. We omit a full
proof because it is very similar to the following cases.
Fact 3.6 Every formula of FO1(A) is equivalent to a formula in basic form.
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3.1.2 Normal form for FOE1
When considering a normal form for FOE1, the fact that we can ‘count types’ using equality
yields a more involved basic form.
Definition 3.7 A formula ϕ ∈ FOE1(A) is in basic form if ϕ =
∨
∇FOE(
#–
T ,Π) where each
disjunct is of the form
∇FOE(
#–
T ,Π) = ∃ #–x.
(
diff( #–x ) ∧
∧
i
τTi(xi) ∧ ∀z.(diff(
#–x , z)→
∨
S∈Π
τS(z))
)
for some set of types Π ⊆ ℘A and where each Ti ⊆ A. The predicate diff(
#–y ), which states
that the given elements are different, is defined as diff(y1, . . . , yn) :=
∧
1≤m<m′<n(ym 6≈ ym′).
We prove that every formula of monadic first-order logic with equality (i.e., FOE1) is
equivalent to a formula in basic form. This result seems to be folklore, however, we give a
detailed proof because some of its ingredients are used in the following section, when giving a
normal form for FOE∞1 . We start by defining the following relation between one-step models.
Definition 3.8 Let D and D′ be one-step models. For every k ∈ N we define
D ∼=k D
′ ⇐⇒ ∀S ⊆ A
(
|S|D = |S|D′ < k
or |S|D, |S|D′ ≥ k
)
Intuitively, two models are related by ∼=k when their type information coincides ‘mod-
ulo k’. Later we will prove that this is the same as saying that they cannot be distinguished
by a formula of FOE1 with quantifier rank lower or equal to k. For the moment, we prove
the following properties of ∼=k .
Proposition 3.9 The following hold
(i) ∼=k is an equivalence relation,
(ii) ∼=k has finite index,
(iii) Every E ∈M1/∼
=
k is characterized by a formula ϕ
=
E ∈ FOE1(A) with qr(ϕ
=
E) = k.
Proof. We only prove the last point. Let E ∈ M1/∼
=
k and let D ∈ E be a representative.
Call S1, . . . , Sn ⊆ A to the types such that |Si|D = ni < k and S
′
1, . . . , S
′
m ⊆ A to those
satisfying |S′i|D ≥ k. Now define
ϕ=E :=
∧
i≤n
(
∃x1, . . . , xni .diff(x1, . . . , xni) ∧
∧
j≤ni
τSi(xj) ∧ ∀z.diff(x1, . . . , xni , z)→ ¬τSi(z)
)
∧
∧
i≤m
(
∃x1, . . . , xk.diff(x1, . . . , xk) ∧
∧
j≤k
τS′i(xj)
)
It is easy to see that qr(ϕ=E) = k and that D
′ |= ϕ=E iff D
′ ∈ E. Observe that ϕ=E gives a
specification of E “type by type”. qed
17
In the following definition we recall a (standard) notion of Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game for
FOE1 which will be used to establish the connection between ∼
=
k and ≡
FOE
k .
Definition 3.10 Let D0 = (D0, V0) and D1 = (D1, V1) be one-step models. We define the
game EF=k (D0,D1) between ∀ and ∃. If Di is one of the models we use D−i to denote the
other model. A position in this game is a pair of sequences #–s0 ∈ D
n
0 and
#–s1 ∈ D
n
1 with n ≤ k.
The game consists of k rounds where in round n+ 1 the following steps are made
1. ∀ chooses an element di in one of the Di,
2. ∃ responds with an element d−i in the model D−i.
3. Let #–si ∈ D
n
i be the sequences of elements chosen up to round n, they are extended to
#–si
′ := #–si · di. Player ∃ survives the round iff she does not get stuck and the function
fn+1 :
#–s0
′ 7→ #–s1′ is a partial isomorphism of one-step models.
Player ∃ wins iff she can survive all k rounds. Given n ≤ k and #–si ∈ D
n
i such that fn :
#–s0 7→
#–s1
is a partial isomorphism, we use EF=k (D0,D1)@(
#–s0,
#–s1) to denote the (initialized) game where
n moves have been played and k − n moves are left to be played.
Lemma 3.11 The following are equivalent
1. D0 ≡
FOE
k D1,
2. D0 ∼
=
k D1,
3. ∃ has a winning strategy in EF=k (D0,D1).
Proof. Step (1) to (2) is direct by Proposition 3.9. For (2) to (3) we give a winning strategy
for ∃ in EF=k (D0,D1). We do it by showing the following claim
Claim 1 Let D0 ∼
=
k D1 and
#–si ∈ D
n
i be such that n < k and fn :
#–s0 7→
#–s1 is a partial
isomorphism; then ∃ can survive one more round in EF=k (D0,D1)@(
#–s0,
#–s1).
Proof of Claim. Let ∀ pick di ∈ Di such that the type of di is T ⊆ A. If di had already
been played then ∃ picks the same element as before and fn+1 = fn. If di is new and |T |Di ≥ k
then, as at most n < k elements have been played, there is always some new d−i ∈ D−i that
∃ can choose that matches di. If |T |Di = m < k then we know that |T |D−i = m. Therefore,
as di is new and fn is injective, there must be a d−i ∈ D−i that ∃ can choose. ◭
Step (3) to (1) is a standard result [3, Corollary 2.2.9] which we prove anyway because we
will need to extend it later. We prove the following loaded statement
Claim 2 Let #–si ∈ D
n
i and ϕ(z1, . . . , zn) ∈ FOE1(A) be such that qr(ϕ) ≤ k − n. If ∃ has a
winning strategy in EF=k (D0,D1)@(
#–s0,
#–s1) then D0 |= ϕ(
#–s0) iff D1 |= ϕ(
#–s1).
Proof of Claim. If ϕ is atomic the claim holds because of fn :
#–s0 7→
#–s1 being a partial
isomorphism. Boolean cases are straightforward. Let ϕ(z1, . . . , zn) = ∃x.ψ(z1, . . . , zn, x)
and suppose D0 |= ϕ(
#–s0). Hence, there exists d0 ∈ D0 such that D0 |= ψ(
#–s0, d0). By
hypothesis we know that ∃ has a winning strategy for EF=k (D0,D1)@(
#–s0,
#–s1). Therefore,
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if ∀ picks d0 ∈ D0 she can respond with some d1 ∈ D1 and has a winning strategy for
EF=k (D0,D1)@(
#–s0·d0,
#–s1·d1). By induction hypothesis, because qr(ψ) ≤ k − (n+ 1), we have
that D0 |= ψ(
#–s0, d0) iff D1 |= ψ(
#–s1, d1) and hence D1 |= ∃x.ψ(
#–s1, x). The other direction is
symmetric. ◭
Combining these claims finishes the proof of the lemma. qed
Theorem 3.12 Every ψ ∈ FOE1(A) is equivalent to a formula in basic form.
Proof. Let qr(ψ) = k and let JψK be the models satisfying ψ. As M1/≡
FOE
k is the same
as M1/∼
=
k by Lemma 3.11, it is easy to see that ψ ≡
∨
{ϕ=E | E ∈ JψK/∼
=
k }. Now it only
remains to see that each ϕ=E is equivalent to ∇FOE(
#–
T ,Π) for some Π ⊆ ℘A and Ti ⊆ A.
The crucial observation is that we will use
#–
T and Π to give a specification of the types
“element by element”. Let D ∈ E be a representative. Call S1, . . . , Sn ⊆ A to the types such
that |Si|D = ni < k and S
′
1, . . . , S
′
m ⊆ A to those satisfying |S
′
i|D ≥ k. The size of the sequence
#–
T is defined to be (
∑n
i=1 ni) + k ×m where
#–
T is contains exactly ni occurrences of type Ti
and k occurrences of each S′j. On the other hand Π = {S
′
1, . . . , S
′
m}. It is straightforward to
check that ϕ=E is equivalent to ∇FOE(
#–
T ,Π), however, the quantifier rank of the latter is only
bounded by k × 2|A| + 1. qed
3.1.3 Normal form for FOE∞1
The logic FOE∞1 basically extends FOE1 with the capacity to tear apart finite and infinite
sets of elements. This is reflected in the normal form for FOE∞1 by adding extra constraints
to the normal form of FOE1.
Definition 3.13 A formula ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 (A) is in basic form if ϕ =
∨
∇FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) where
each disjunct is of the form
∇FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) = ∇FOE(
#–
T ,Π ∪ Σ) ∧ ∇∞(Σ)
where
∇∞(Σ) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞y.τS(y) ∧ ∀
∞y.
∨
S∈Σ
τS(y)
for some set of types Π,Σ ⊆ ℘A and each Ti ⊆ A.
A small argument reveals that, intuitively, every disjunct expresses that each one-step
model satisfying it admits a partition of its domain in three parts:
(i) Distinct elements t1, . . . , tn with type T1, . . . , Tn,
(ii) Finitely many elements whose types belong to Π, and
(iii) For each S ∈ Σ, infinitely many elements with type S.
In the same way as before, we define a relation ∼∞k which can be clearly seen to be a
refinement of ∼=k which adds information about the (in-)finiteness of the types.
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Definition 3.14 Let D and D′ be one-step models. For every k ∈ N we define
D ∼∞0 D
′ ⇐⇒ always
D ∼∞k+1 D
′ ⇐⇒ D ∼=k+1 D
′ and
∀S ⊆ A
(
|S|D, |S|D′ < ω or |S|D, |S|D′ ≥ ω
)
Proposition 3.15 The following hold
(i) ∼∞k is an equivalence relation,
(ii) ∼∞k has finite index,
(iii) ∼∞k is a refinement of ∼
=
k ,
(iv) Every E ∈M1/∼
∞
k is characterized by a formula ϕ
∞
E ∈ FOE
∞
1 (A) with qr(ϕ) = k.
Proof. We only prove the last point, for k > 0. Let E ∈ M1/∼
∞
k and let D ∈ E be a
representative of the class. Let E′ ∈M1/∼
=
k be the eqivalence class of D with respect to ∼
=
k .
Call S1, . . . , Sn ⊆ A to the types such that |Si|D ≥ ω and S
′
1, . . . , S
′
m ⊆ A to those satisfying
|S′i|D < ω. Now define
ϕ∞E := ϕ
=
E′ ∧
∧
i≤n
∃∞x.τSi(x) ∧
∧
i≤m
∀∞x.¬τS′i(x).
It is easy to see that qr(ϕ∞E ) = k and that D
′ |= ϕ∞E iff D
′ ∈ E. qed
Now we give a notion of Ehrenfeucht-Fras¨se´ game for FOE∞1 . In this case the game
extends EF=k with a move for ∃
∞.
Definition 3.16 Let D0 = (D0, V0) and D1 = (D1, V1) be one-step models. We define the
game EF∞k (D0,D1) between ∀ and ∃. A position in this game is a pair of sequences
#–s0 ∈ D
n
0
and #–s1 ∈ D
n
1 with n ≤ k. The game consists of k rounds where in round n+ 1 the following
steps are made. First ∀ chooses to perform one of the following types of moves:
(a) Second-order move
1. ∀ chooses an infinite set Xi ⊆ Di,
2. ∃ responds with an infinite set X−i ⊆ D−i,
3. ∀ chooses an element x−i ∈ X−i,
4. ∃ responds with an element xi ∈ Xi.
(b) First-order move
1. ∀ chooses an element di ∈ Di,
2. ∃ responds with an element d−i ∈ D−i.
Let #–si ∈ D
n
i be the sequences of elements chosen up to round n, they are extended to
#–si
′ := #–si · di. ∃ survives the round iff she does not get stuck and the function fn+1 :
#–s0
′ 7→ #–s1
′
is a partial isomorphism of one-step models.
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This game can be seen as an adaptation of the Ehrenfeucht-Fras¨se´ game for monotone
generalized quantifiers found in [11] to the case of full monadic first-order logic.
Lemma 3.17 The following are equivalent
1. D0 ≡FOE
∞
k D1,
2. D0 ∼
∞
k D1,
3. ∃ has a winning strategy in EF∞k (D0,D1).
Proof. Step (1) to (2) is direct by Proposition 3.15. For (2) to (3) we show
Claim 1 Let D0 ∼
∞
k D1 and
#–si ∈ D
n
i be such that n < k and fn :
#–s0 7→
#–s1 is a partial
isomorphism; then ∃ can survive one more round in EF∞k (D0,D1)@(
#–s0,
#–s1).
Proof of Claim. We focus on the second-order moves because the first-order moves are
the same as in the corresponding Claim of Lemma 3.11. Let ∀ choose an infinite set Xi ⊆ Di,
we would like ∃ to choose a set X−i ⊆ D−i such that the following conditions hold:
(a) Let #–rj :=
#–sj ∩Xj be the restriction of
#–sj to the elements of Xj . We want f
′ : #–r0 7→
#–r1 to
be a well-defined partial isomorphism between the restricted models D0|X0 and D1|X1,
(b) D0|X0 ∼
=
m+1 D1|X1 where m = |ri|. That is, for all S ⊆ A,
(i) if |S|Xi < m+ 1 then |S|X−i = |S|Xi ,
(ii) if |S|Xi ≥ m+ 1 then |S|X−i ≥ m+ 1,
(c) X−i is infinite.
First we prove that such a set exists and then we will use it to prove the claim.
To satisfy item (a) she just needs to add to X−i the elements connected to Xi by fn; this
is not a problem. For item (b) the only hinder is that, while adding elements to X−i, we
cannot make use of those elements of D−i which are in
#   –s−i but not in
#   –r−i, since that would
break condition (a). It is not difficult to see that because m+ 1 ≤ k and D0 ∼
∞
k D1 implies
D0 ∼
=
k D1 then we always have enough elements to satisfy the required constraints. For the
last item observe that as Xi is infinite but there are only finitely many types, hence there
must be some S such that |S|Xi ≥ ω. It is then safe to add infinitely many elements for
S in X−i while considering point (b). Moreover, the existence of infinitely many elements
satisfying S in D−i are guaranteed by D0 ∼
∞
k D1.
Having shown that ∃ can choose a set X−i satisfying the above conditions, we continue the
proof of the claim as follows: as D0|X0 ∼
=
m+1 D1|X1 and f
′ : #–r0 7→
#–r1 is a partial isomorphism
between them (with sequences of length m) then by the first claim of Lemma 3.11, we know
that ∃ can survive one round in EF=m+1(D0|X0,D1|X1)@(
#–r0,
#–r1). In particular, she can survive
the “first-order part” of the second-order move we were considering. This finishes the proof
of the claim. ◭
Going back to the proof of the lemma, for step (3) to (1) we prove the following claim.
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Claim 2 Let #–si ∈ D
n
i and ϕ(z1, . . . , zn) ∈ FOE
∞
1 (A) be such that qr(ϕ) ≤ k − n. If ∃ has a
winning strategy in EF∞k (D0,D1)@(
#–s0,
#–s1) then D0 |= ϕ(
#–s0) iff D1 |= ϕ(
#–s1).
Proof of Claim. All the cases involving operators of FOE1 are the same as in Lemma 3.11.
We prove the inductive case for the generalized quantifier. Let ϕ(z1, . . . , zn) be of the form
∃∞x.ψ(z1, . . . , zn, x) and let D0 |= ϕ(
#–s0). Hence, there is an infinite set X0 ⊆ D0 such that
D0 |= ψ(
#–s0, x0) if and only if x0 ∈ X0. (7)
By hypothesis we know that ∃ has a winning strategy for EF∞k (D0,D1)@(
#–s0,
#–s1). Therefore,
if ∀ plays a second-order move by picking X0 ⊆ D0 she can respond with some infinite set
X1 ⊆ D1. We claim that D1 |= ψ(
#–s1, x1) for every x1 ∈ X1. First observe that if this holds
then X ′1 := {d1 ∈ D1 | D1 |= ψ(
#–s1, d1)} must be infinite, and hence D1 |= ∃
∞x.ψ( #–s1, x).
Assume, for a contradiction, that D1 6|= ψ(
#–s1, x
′
1) for some x
′
1 ∈ X1. Let ∀ play that x
′
1 as
the second part of his move. Then, as ∃ has a winning strategy, she will respond with some
x′0 ∈ X0 such that she has a winning strategy for EF
∞
k (D0,D1)@(
#–s0·x
′
0,
#–s1·x
′
1). By induction
hypothesis, as qr(ψ) ≤ k − (n+ 1), this means that D0 |= ψ(
#–s0, x
′
0) iff D1 |= ϕ(
#–s1, x
′
1) which
contradicts (7). The other direction is symmetric. ◭
Combining the claims finishes the proof of the lemma. qed
Theorem 3.18 Every ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 (A) is equivalent to a formula in basic form.
Proof. This can be proved using the same technique as in Theorem 3.12. Hence we only
focus on showing that ϕ∞E ≡ ∇FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) for some Π,Σ ⊆ ℘A and Ti ⊆ A. Recall that
ϕ∞E = ϕ
=
E′ ∧
∧
i≤n
∃∞x.τSi(x) ∧
∧
i≤m
∀∞x.¬τS′i(x)
and from Theorem 3.12 we know that this is equivalent to
ϕ∞E = ∇FOE(
#–
T ′,Π′) ∧
∧
i≤n
∃∞x.τSi(x) ∧
∧
i≤m
∀∞x.¬τS′i(x)
for some Π′,⊆ ℘A and T ′i ⊆ A. Now separate Π
′ as Π′ = Π ⊎ Σ where Π is composed of the
finite types (i.e., the S′i) and Σ is composed of the infinite types (i.e., the Si). We claim that
ϕ∞E ≡ ∇FOE∞(
#–
T ′,Π,Σ). After a minor rewritting, we have to show that the following two
formulas are equivalent:
∇FOE(
#–
T ′,Π′) ∧
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞x.τS(x) ∧
∧
S∈Π
∀∞x.¬τS(x) (8)
∇FOE(
#–
T ′,Π ∪ Σ) ∧
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞y.τS(y) ∧ ∀
∞y.
∨
S∈Σ
τS(y) (9)
It is clear that ∇FOE(
#–
T ′,Π′) is equivalent to ∇FOE(
#–
T ′,Π∪Σ) and that the infinite-existential
parts are also equivalent. Therefore we focus on the last part of both formulas.
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⇒ We show that (8) implies ∀∞y.
∨
S∈Σ τS(y). By contrapositive assume that there are
infinitely many elements satisfying
∧
S∈Σ ¬τS(y), that is, infinitely many elements with their
type outside Σ. Because of the FOE part, these elements should have their type in Π′ = Π∪Σ.
Therefore, as the number of types is finite, there must be some type P ∈ Π such that
∃∞x.τP (x) which contradicts the last part of (8).
⇐ We show that (9) implies
∧
S∈Π ∀
∞x.¬τS(x). By contrapositive assume there is some
type P ∈ Π such that ∃∞x.τP (x). Then, in particular, these elements do not have their type
in Σ and hence there are infinitely many elements satisfying
∧
S∈Σ ¬τS(y) which contradicts
the last part of (9). qed
3.2 One-step monotonicity
Given a one-step logic L1(A) and formula ϕ ∈ L1(A). We say that ϕ is monotone in a ∈ A
if for every one step model (D,V : A→ ℘D) and assignment g : iVar→ D,
If (D,V ), g |= ϕ and V (a) ⊆ E then (D,V [a 7→ E]), g |= ϕ.
We use L+1 (A) to denote the fragment of L1(A) composed of formulas monotone in all a ∈ A.
Monotonicity is usually tightly related to positivity. If the quantifiers are well-behaved
(i.e., monotone) then a formula ϕ will usually be monotone in a ∈ A iff a has positive polarity
in ϕ, that is, if it occurs under an even number of negations. This is the case for all one-
step logics considered in this article. In this section we give a syntactic characterization of
monotonicity for several one-step logics.
Convention. Given S ∪ {a} ⊆ A we use τaS to denote the a-positive A-type defined as
τaS(x) :=
∧
b∈S
b(x) ∧
∧
b∈A\(S∪{a})
¬b(x).
Intuitively, τaS is an A-type where a can only occur positively and all other predicates occur
either positively or negatively.
3.2.1 Monotone fragment of FO1
Theorem 3.19 A formula of FO1(A) is monotone in a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a sentence
given by
ϕ ::= ψ | a(x) | ∃x.ϕ(x) | ∀x.ϕ(x) | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ
where ψ ∈ FO1(A \ {a}). We denote this fragment as FO1Ma(A).
The result will follow from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.20 If ϕ ∈ FO1Ma(A) then ϕ is monotone in a.
Proof. The proof is a routine argument by induction on the complexity of ϕ. qed
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To prove that the fragment is complete we need to show that every formula which is
monotone in a is equivalent to some formula in FO1Ma. We prove a stronger result: we
give a translation that constructively maps arbitrary formulas into FO1Ma. The interesting
observation is that the translation will preserve truth iff the given formula is monotone in a.
Lemma 3.21 There exists a translation (−)◦ : FO1(A) → FO1Ma(A) such that a formula
ϕ ∈ FO1(A) is monotone in a if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ◦.
Proof. To define the translation we assume that ϕ is in a normal form
∨
∇FO(Σ) where
∇FO(Σ) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τS(x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ
τS(x)
for some types Σ ⊆ ℘A. For the translation, let (
∨
∇FO(Σ))
◦ :=
∨
∇aFO(Σ) and
∇aFO(Σ) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τaS(x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ
τaS(x)
From the construction it is clear that ϕ◦ ∈ FO1Ma(A) and therefore the right-to-left
direction of the lemma is immediate by Lemma 3.20. For the left-to-right direction assume
that ϕ is monotone in a, we have to prove that (D,V ) |= ϕ iff (D,V ) |= ϕ◦.
⇒ This direction is trivial.
⇐ Assume (D,V ) |= ϕ◦ and let ∇aFO(Σ) be such that (D,V ) |= ∇
a
FO(Σ). It is safe to assume
that the only (a-positive) types realized in (D,V ) are exactly those in Σ and that every type
has a (single) distinct witness. For every S ∈ Σ, let dS be the witness of the a-positive type
τaS(x) in (D,V ). Let U := {dS | S ∈ Σ, a /∈ S} and V
′ := V [a 7→ V (a) \ U ].
Claim 1 (D,V ′) |= ∇FO(Σ).
Proof of Claim. First we show that the existential part of the normal form is satisfied.
That is, that for every S ∈ Σ we have a witness for the full type τS(x). If a ∈ S the witness is
given by ϕ◦, that is, dS . If a /∈ S then we specially crafted dS to be a witness. The universal
part is clearly satisfied. ◭
To finish it is enough to observe that, by monotonicity of ϕ, we get (D,V ) |= ϕ. qed
Putting together the above lemmas we obtain Theorem 3.19. Moreover, a careful analysis
of the translation gives us the following corollary, providing normal forms for the monotone
fragment of FO1.
Corollary 3.22 Let ϕ ∈ FO1(A), the following hold:
(i) The formula ϕ is monotone in a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a formula in the basic form∨
∇aFO(Σ) for some types Σ ⊆ ℘A.
(ii) The formula ϕ is monotone in every a ∈ A (i.e., ϕ ∈ FO+1 (A)) iff ϕ is equivalent to a
formula in the basic form
∨
∇+FO(Σ) for some types Σ ⊆ ℘A, where
∇+FO(Σ) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τ+S (x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ
τ+S (x).
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3.2.2 Monotone fragment of FOE∞1
Theorem 3.23 A formula of FOE∞1 (A) is monotone in a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a sentence
given by
ϕ ::= ψ | a(x) | ∃x.ϕ(x) | ∀x.ϕ(x) | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃∞x.ϕ(x) | ∀∞x.ϕ(x)
where ψ ∈ FOE∞1 (A \ {a}). We denote this fragment as FOE
∞
1 Ma(A).
Observe that x ≈ y and x 6≈ y are included in the case ψ ∈ FOE∞1 (A \ {a}). The result
will follow from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.24 If ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 Ma(A) then ϕ is monotone in a.
Proof. The proof is basically the same as Lemma 3.20. That is, we show by induction, that
any one-step formula ϕ in the fragment (which may not be a sentence) satisfies, for every
one-step model (D,V : A→ ℘D) and assignment g : iVar → D,
If (D,V ), g |= ϕ and V (a) ⊆ E then (D,V [a 7→ E]), g |= ϕ.
We focus on the cases for the generalized quantifiers. Let (D,V ), g |= ϕ and V (a) ⊆ E.
• Case ϕ = ∃∞x.ϕ′(x). By definition there exists an infinite set I ⊆ D such that for all
d ∈ I we have (D,V ), g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ′(x). By induction hypothesis (D,V [a 7→ E]), g[x 7→
d] |= ϕ′(x) for all d ∈ I. Therefore (D,V [a 7→ E]), g |= ∃∞x.ϕ′(x).
• Case ϕ = ∀∞x.ϕ′(x). By definition there exists I ⊆ D such that for all d ∈ I we
have (D,V ), g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ′(x) and D \ I is finite. By induction hypothesis (D,V [a 7→
E]), g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ′(x) for all d ∈ I. Therefore (D,V [a 7→ E]), g |= ∀∞x.ϕ′(x).
qed
Lemma 3.25 There exists a translation (−)◦ : FOE∞1 (A) → FOE
∞
1 Ma(A) such that a for-
mula ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 (A) is monotone in a if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ
◦.
Proof. We assume that ϕ is in a normal form
∨
∇FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) where
∇FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) = ∇FOE(
#–
T ,Π ∪Σ) ∧∇∞(Σ).
for some sets of types Π,Σ ⊆ ℘A and each Ti ⊆ A. For the translation, we define
(
∨
∇FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ))◦ :=
∨
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ)
where
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) := ∇aFOE(
#–
T ,Π ∪ Σ) ∧ ∇a∞(Σ)
∇aFOE(
#–
T ,Λ) := ∃ #–x .
(
diff( #–x ) ∧
∧
i
τaTi(xi) ∧ ∀z.(diff(
#–x , z)→
∨
S∈Λ
τaS(z))
)
∇a∞(Σ) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞y.τaS(y) ∧ ∀
∞y.
∨
S∈Σ
τaS(y).
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From the construction it is clear that ϕ◦ ∈ FOE∞1 Ma(A) and therefore the right-to-left direc-
tion of the lemma is immediate by Lemma 3.24. For the left-to-right direction assume that
ϕ is monotone in a, we have to prove that (D,V ) |= ϕ iff (D,V ) |= ϕ◦.
⇒ This direction is trivial.
⇐ Assume (D,V ) |= ϕ◦. Observe that the elements of D can be partitioned as follows:
(a) Elements ti ∈ D witnessing the a-positive type Ti ∈
#–
T ,
(b) Disjoint sets {DS ⊆ D | S ∈ Σ} such that each DS is infinite and every d ∈ DS is a
witness for the a-positive type S ∈ Σ,
(c) A finite set DΠ ⊆ D of witnesses of the a-positive types in Π.
In what follows we assume that every d ∈ D is the witness of some fixed a-positive type
Sd ∈
#–
T ∪ Π ∪ Σ. We define a new valuation V ′ as V ′(b) = V (b) for all b ∈ A \ {b} and
V ′(a) := {d ∈ D | a ∈ Sd}. Observe that V
′(a) ⊆ V (a).
Claim 1 (D,V ′) |= ϕ.
Proof of Claim. First we check that (D,V ′) |= ∇FOE(
#–
T ,Π∪Σ). It is easy to see that the
elements ti work as witnesses for the full types Ti. That is (D,V
′) |= τTi(ti) for every i. To
prove the universal part of the formula it is enough to show that
1. Every element d ∈ DΠ realizes the full type Sd ∈ Π,
2. For all S ∈ Σ, every element of DS realizes the full type S.
Let d be an element of either DΠ or any of the DS . By (b) and (c) we know (D,V ) |= τ
a
Sd
(d).
If a ∈ Sd we can trivially conclude (D,V
′) |= τSd(d). If a /∈ Sd, by definition of V
′ we know
that d /∈ V ′(a) and hence we can also conclude that (D,V ′) |= τSd(d).
To prove that (D,V ′) |=
∧
S∈Σ ∃
∞y.τS(y)∧∀
∞y.
∨
S∈Σ τS(y) we only need to observe that
the existential part is satisfied because each DS is infinite by (c) and the universal part is
satisfied because the set DΠ ∪
#–
T is finite by (b). ◭
To finish the proof of the lemma, note that by monotonicity of ϕ we get (D,V ) |= ϕ. qed
Putting together the above lemmas we obtain Theorem 3.23. Moreover, a careful analysis
of the translation gives us the following corollary, providing normal forms for the monotone
fragment of FOE∞1 .
Corollary 3.26 Let ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 (A), the following hold:
(i) The formula ϕ is monotone in a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a formula in the basic form∨
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) for some types Π,Σ ⊆ ℘A and each Ti ⊆ A.
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(ii) The formula ϕ is monotone in every a ∈ A (i.e., ϕ ∈ FOE∞1
+(A)) iff it is equivalent to
a formula in the basic form
∨
∇+FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) for types Π,Σ ⊆ ℘A and Ti ⊆ A, where
∇+FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) := ∇+FOE(
#–
T ,Π ∪ Σ) ∧ ∇+∞(Σ)
∇+FOE(
#–
T ,Λ) := ∃ #–x .
(
diff( #–x ) ∧
∧
i
τ+Ti(xi) ∧ ∀z.(diff(
#–x , z)→
∨
S∈Λ
τ+S (z))
)
∇+∞(Σ) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞y.τ+S (y) ∧ ∀
∞y.
∨
S∈Σ
τ+S (y).
3.3 One-step continuity
Consider a one-step logic L1(A) and formula ϕ ∈ L1(A). We say that ϕ is continuous in
a ∈ A if ϕ is monotone in a and additionally, for every (D,V ) and assignment g : iVar→ D,
if (D,V ), g |= ϕ then ∃U ⊆ω V (a) such that (D,V [a 7→ U ]), g |= ϕ.
It will be useful to give a syntactic characterization of continuity for several one-step logics.
3.3.1 Continuous fragment of FO1
Theorem 3.27 A formula of FO1(A) is continuous in a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a sentence
given by
ϕ ::= ψ | a(x) | ∃x.ϕ(x) | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ
where ψ ∈ FO1(A \ {a}). We denote this fragment as FO1Ca(A).
The theorem will follow from the next two lemmas.
Lemma 3.28 If ϕ ∈ FO1Ca(A) then ϕ is continuous in a.
Proof. First observe that ϕ is monotone in a by Theorem 3.19. We show, by induction, that
any one-step formula ϕ in the fragment (which may not be a sentence) satisfies, for every
one-step model (D,V : A→ ℘D), assignment g : iVar→ D,
If (D,V ), g |= ϕ then ∃U ⊆ω V (a) such that (D,V [a 7→ U ]), g |= ϕ.
• If ϕ = ψ ∈ FO1(A \ {a}) changes in the a part of the valuation will make no difference
and hence the condition is trivial.
• Case ϕ = a(x): if (D,V ), g |= a(x) then g(x) ∈ V (a). Clearly, g(x) ∈ V [a 7→ {g(x)}](a)
and hence (D,V [a 7→ {g(x)}]), g |= a(x).
• Case ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2: assume (D,V ), g |= ϕ. Without loss of generality we can assume
that (D,V ), g |= ϕ1 and hence by induction hypothesis we have that there is U ⊆ω V (a)
such that (D,V [a 7→ U ]), g |= ϕ1 which clearly satisfies (D,V [a 7→ U ]), g |= ϕ.
• Case ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2: assume (D,V ), g |= ϕ. By induction hypothesis we have U1, U2 ⊆ω
V (a) such that (D,V [a 7→ U1]), g |= ϕ1 and (D,V [a 7→ U2]), g |= ϕ2. By monotonicity
this also holds with V [a 7→ U1 ∪ U2] and therefore (D,V [a 7→ U1 ∪ U2]), g |= ϕ.
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• Case ϕ = ∃x.ϕ′(x) and (D,V ), g |= ϕ. By definition there exists d ∈ D such that
(D,V ), g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ′(x). By induction hypothesis there exists U ⊆ω V (a) such that
(D,V [a 7→ U ]), g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ′(x) and hence (D,V [a 7→ U ]), g |= ∃x.ϕ′(x).
qed
Lemma 3.29 There exists a translation (−)△ : FO1Ma(A)→ FO1Ca(A) such that a formula
ϕ ∈ FO1Ma(A) is continuous in a if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ
△.
Proof. To define the translation we assume that ϕ is in basic form
∨
∇aFO(Σ) where
∇aFO(Σ) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τaS(x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ
τaS(x)
for some types Σ ⊆ ℘A. For the translation, let (
∨
∇aFO(Σ))
△ :=
∨
∇aFO(Σ)
△ and
∇aFO(Σ)
△ :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τaS(x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ−a
τaS(x)
where Σ−a := {S ∈ Σ | a /∈ S}.
From the construction it is clear that ϕ△ ∈ FO1Ca(A) and therefore the right-to-left
direction of the lemma is immediate by Lemma 3.28. For the left-to-right direction assume
that ϕ is continuous in a, we have to prove that (D,V ) |= ϕ iff (D,V ) |= ϕ△, for every
one-step model (D,V ). We will take a slightly different but equivalent approach.
It is easy to prove that (D,V ) ≡FO (D×ω, Vπ) where D×ω has countably many copies of
each element in D and Vπ(a) := {(d, k) | d ∈ V (a), k ∈ ω}. Moreover, as ϕ is continuous in a
there is U ⊆ω Vπ(a) such that V
′
π := V [a 7→ U ] satisfies (D × ω, Vπ) |= ϕ iff (D × ω, V
′
π) |= ϕ.
Therefore, it is enough to prove that (D × ω, V ′π) |= ϕ iff (D × ω, V
′
π) |= ϕ
△.
⇒ Let (D × ω, V ′π) |= ∇FO(Σ), we show that (D × ω, V
′
π) |= ∇FO(Σ)
△. The existential part
of ∇FO(Σ)
△ is trivially true. We have to show that every element of (D × ω, V ′π) realizes a
a-positive type in Σ−a . Let (d, k) ∈ D × ω and T be the (full) type of (d, k). If a /∈ T then
trivially T ∈ Σ−a and we are done. Suppose a ∈ T . Observe that in D × ω we have infinitely
many copies of d ∈ D. However, as V ′π(a) is finite, there must be some (d, k
′) with type
T ′ := T \ {a}. For ∇FO(Σ) to be true we must have T
′ ∈ Σ and hence T ′ ∈ Σ−a . It is easy to
see that (d, k) realizes the a-positive type T ′.
⇐ Let (D × ω, V ′π) |= ∇FO(Σ)
△, we show that (D × ω, V ′π) |= ∇FO(Σ). The existential part
is again trivial. For the universal part just observe that Σ−a ⊆ Σ. qed
Putting together the above lemmas we obtain Theorem 3.27. Moreover, a careful analysis
of the translation gives us the following corollary, providing normal forms for the continuous
fragment of FO1.
Corollary 3.30 Let ϕ ∈ FO1(A), the following hold:
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(i) The formula ϕ is continuous in a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a formula in the basic form∨
χaΣ for some types Σ ⊆ ℘A, where χ
a
Σ is given by
χaΣ :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τaS(x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ−a
τaS(x).
(ii) If ϕ is monotone in A (i.e., ϕ ∈ FO+1 (A)) then ϕ is continuous in a ∈ A iff it is
equivalent to a formula in the basic form
∨
χ+Σ for some types Σ ⊆ ℘A, where
χ+Σ :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τ+S (x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ−a
τ+S (x).
3.3.2 Continuous fragment of FOE∞1
Theorem 3.31 A formula of FOE∞1 (A) is continuous in a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a sen-
tence given by
ϕ ::= ψ | a(x) | ∃x.ϕ(x) | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ |Wx.(ϕ,ψ)
where ψ ∈ FOE∞1 (A \ {a}) and Wx.(ϕ,ψ) := ∀x.(ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)) ∧ ∀
∞x.ψ(x). We denote this
fragment as FOE∞1 Ca(A).
Universal quantification is usually problematic for preserving continuity because of its
potentially infinite nature. However, in the case of Wx.(ϕ,ψ), the combination of both
quantifiers ensures that all the elements are covered by ϕ ∨ ψ but only finitely many are
required to make ϕ true (which contains a ∈ A). This gives no trouble for continuity in a.
The theorem will follow from the next two lemmas.
Lemma 3.32 If ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 Ca(A) then ϕ is continuous in a.
Proof. Observe that monotonicity of ϕ is guaranteed by Theorem 3.23. We show, by
induction, that any formula of the fragment (which may not be a sentence) satisfies, for
every one-step model (D,V : A→ ℘D) and assignment g : iVar → D,
If (D,V ), g |= ϕ then ∃U ⊆ω V (a) such that (D,V [a 7→ U ]), g |= ϕ.
We focus on the inductive case of the new quantifier. Let ϕ′ =Wx.(ϕ,ψ), i.e.,
ϕ′ = ∀x. (ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
α(x)
∧∀∞x.ψ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
β
.
Let (D,V ), g |= ϕ′. By induction hypothesis, for every gd := g[x 7→ d] which satisfies
(D,V ), gd |= α(x) there is Ud ⊆ω V (a) such that (D,V [a 7→ Ud]), gd |= α(x). The crucial
observation is that because of β, only finitely many elements of d make ψ(d) false. Let
U :=
⋃
{Ud | (D,V ), gd 6|= ψ(x)}. Note that U is a finite union of finite sets, hence finite.
Claim 1 Let VU := V [a 7→ U ], we have (D,VU ), g |= ϕ
′.
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Proof of Claim. It is clear that (D,VU ), g |= β because ψ is a-free. To show that the
first conjunct is true we have to show that (D,VU ), gd |= ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x) for every d ∈ D. We
consider two cases: (i) if (D,V ), gd |= ψ(x) we are done, again because ψ is a-free; (ii) if the
former is not the case then Ud ⊆ U ; moreover, we knew that (D,V [a 7→ Ud]), gd |= α(x) and
by monotonicity of α(x) we can conclude that (D,VU ), gd |= α(x). ◭
This finishes the proof of the lemma. qed
Lemma 3.33 There exists a translation (−)△ : FOE∞1 Ma(A) → FOE
∞
1 Ca(A) such that a
formula ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 Ma(A) is continuous in a if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ
△.
Proof. We assume that ϕ is in basic normal form, i.e., ϕ =
∨
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ). For the
translation let (
∨
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ))△ :=
∨
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ)△ and
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ)△ :=
{
⊥ if a ∈
⋃
Σ
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) otherwise.
First we prove the right-to-left direction of the lemma. By Lemma 3.32 it is enough to
show that ϕ△ ∈ FOE∞1 Ca(A). We focus on the disjuncts of ϕ
△. The interesting case is when
a /∈
⋃
Σ. If we rearrange ∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) and define the formulas ϕ′, ψ as follows:
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) ≡ ∃ #–x.
(
diff( #–x ) ∧
∧
i
τaTi(xi) ∧
∀z.(¬diff( #–x , z) ∨
∨
S∈Π
τaS(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϕ′( #–x ,z)
∨
∨
S∈Σ
τaS(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ(z)
) ∧
∀∞y.
∨
S∈Σ
τaS(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ(y)
)
∧
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞y.τaS(y),
then we get that
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) ≡ ∃ #–x.
(
diff( #–x ) ∧
∧
i
τaTi(xi) ∧Wz.(ϕ
′( #–x , z), ψ(z))
)
∧
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞y.τaS(y)
which, because a /∈
⋃
Σ, is in the required fragment.
For the left-to-right direction of the lemma we have to prove that ϕ ≡ ϕ△.
⇐ Let (D,V ) |= ϕ△. The only difference between ϕ and ϕ△ is that some disjuncts may have
been replaced by ⊥. Therefore this direction is trivial.
⇒ Let (D,V ) |= ϕ. Because ϕ is continuous in a we may assume that V (a) is finite. Let
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) be a disjunct of ϕ such that (D,V ) |= ∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ). If a /∈
⋃
Σ we
trivially conclude that (D,V ) |= ϕ△ because the disjunct remains unchanged. Suppose now
that a ∈
⋃
Σ, then there must be some S ∈ Σ with a ∈ S. Because (D,V ) |= ∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ)
we have, in particular, that (D,V ) |= ∃∞y.τaS(x) and hence V (a) must be infinite which is
absurd. qed
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Putting together the above lemmas we obtain Theorem 3.31. Moreover, a careful analysis
of the translation gives us the following corollary, providing normal forms for the continuous
fragment of FOE∞1 .
Corollary 3.34 Let ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 (A), the following hold:
(i) The formula ϕ is continuous in a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a formula in the basic form∨
∇aFOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) for some types Π,Σ ⊆ ℘A and Ti ⊆ A such that a /∈
⋃
Σ.
(ii) If ϕ is monotone in every element of A (i.e., ϕ ∈ FOE∞1
+(A)) then ϕ is continuous
in a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a formula in the basic form
∨
∇+FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) for some
types Π,Σ ⊆ ℘A and Ti ⊆ A such that a /∈
⋃
Σ.
3.4 One-step co-continuity and Boolean duals
Consider a one-step logic L1(A) and formula ϕ ∈ L1(A). We say that ϕ is co-continuous in
a ∈ A if ϕ is monotone in a and, for all (D,V ) and g : iVar→ D,
if (D,V ), g 6|= ϕ then ∃U ⊆ω V (a) such that (D,V [a 7→ D \ U ]), g 6|= ϕ.
Observe that, already with the abstract definition of Boolean dual given in Definition 2.5
we can prove the expected relationship between the notions of continuity and co-continuity.
Proposition 3.35 Let ϕ ∈ L1(A), ϕ is continuous in a ∈ A iff ϕ
δ is co-continuous in a.
Proof. Let ϕ be continuous in a, we prove that ϕδ is co-continuous in a:
(D,V ) 6|= ϕδ iff (D,V c) |= ϕ (Definition 2.5)
iff ∃U ⊆ω V
c(a) such that (D,V c[a 7→ U ]) |= ϕ (ϕ continuous)
iff ∃U ′ ⊆ω V (a) such that (D,V [a 7→ D \ U
′]) 6|= ϕ (Definition of V c)
The proof of the other direction is analogous. qed
To define a syntactic notion of co-continuity we first give a concrete definition of the
dualization operator of Definition 2.5 and then show that the one-step language FOE∞1 is
closed under Boolean duals.
Definition 3.36 Let ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 (A). The dual ϕ
δ ∈ FOE∞1 (A) of ϕ is defined as follows.
(a(x))δ := a(x)
(⊤)δ := ⊥ (⊥)δ := ⊤
(x ≈ y)δ := x 6≈ y (x 6≈ y)δ := x ≈ y
(ϕ ∧ ψ)δ := (ϕ)δ ∨ (ψ)δ (ϕ ∨ ψ)δ := (ϕ)δ ∧ (ψ)δ
(∃x.ψ)δ := ∀x.(ψ)δ (∀x.ψ)δ := ∃x.(ψ)δ
(∃∞x.ψ)δ := ∀∞x.(ψ)δ (∀∞x.ψ)δ := ∃∞x.(ψ)δ
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Remark 3.37 Observe that if ϕ ∈ FO1(A) then ϕ
δ ∈ FO1(A) and that the operator preserves
positivity of the predicates. That is, if ϕ ∈ FOE∞1
+(A) then ϕδ ∈ FOE∞1
+(A) and the same
occurs with FO+1 (A). ✁
The proof of the following Proposition is a routine check.
Proposition 3.38 The sentences ϕ and ϕδ are Boolean duals, for every ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 (A).
We are now ready to give the syntactic definition of a co-continuous fragment for the
one-step logics into consideration.
Definition 3.39 Let A be a set of names. The syntactic fragments of FOE∞1 (A) and FO1(A)
which are co-continuous in a ∈ A are given by
FOE∞1 Ca(A) := {ϕ | ϕ
δ ∈ FOE∞1 Ca(A)} FO1Ca(A) := {ϕ | ϕ
δ ∈ FO1Ca(A)}.
Proposition 3.40 A formula ϕ ∈ FOE∞1 (A) is co-continuous in a ∈ A iff ϕ ∈ FOE
∞
1 Ca(A).
Proof. This is a consequence of Proposition 3.35, Theorem 3.31 and Definition 3.39. qed
4 Automata for WMSO
In this section we provide an automata-theoretic characterization of WMSO. As argued in the
introduction, WMSO-automata will be defined as the automata in Aut(FOE∞1 ) that satisfy
two additional properties: weakness and continuity. We now briefly discuss these properties
in a slightly more general setting, starting with weakness.
Definition 4.1 Let L1 be a one-step language, and let A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 be in Aut(L1).
Given two states a, b of A, we say that there is a transition from a to b, notation: a ❀ b, if
b occurs in ∆(a, c) for some c ∈ C. We let the reachability relation  denote the reflexive-
transitive closure of the relation ❀.
A strongly connected -component (-SCC) is a subset M ⊆ A such that for every
a, b ∈M we have a  b and b  c. The SCC is called maximal (MSCC) when M ∪{a} ceases
to be a SCC for any choice of a ∈ A \M .
We say that Ω is a weak parity condition, and A is a weak parity automaton if we have
(weakness) if a  b and b  a then Ω(a) = Ω(b).
Remark 4.2 Any weak parity automaton A is equivalent to a weak parity automaton A′
with Ω : A′ → {0, 1}. From now on we therefore consider only weak parity automata with
priorities 0 and 1. ✁
As explained in the introduction, the leading intuition is that weak parity automata are
those unable to register non-trivial properties concerning the vertical ‘dimension’ of input
trees. Indeed on trees they characterize WFMSO, that is, the fragment of MSO where the
quantification is restricted to well-founded subsets of trees (corresponding to the notion of
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noetherian subset if we consider arbitrary transition systems). We refer to the literature on
weak automata [14] and on WFMSO [5, 24] for more details.
We now turn to the second condition that we will be interested in, viz., continuity. In-
tuitively, this property expresses a constraint on how much of the horizontal ‘dimension’ of
an input tree the automaton is allowed to process. It will be instrumental in showing that
the class of automata that we are going to shape characterizes WMSO. The idea is that,
as WMSO-quantifiers range over finite sets, the weakeness condition corresponds to those
sets being ‘vertically’ finite (i.e. included in well-founded subtrees), whereas the continuity
condition corresponds to them being ‘horizontally’ finite (i.e. included in finitely branching
subtrees).
First we formulate our continuity condition abstractly in the setting of Aut(L1). Given
the semantics of the one-step language L1, the (semantic) notion of (co-)continuity applies
to one-step formulas (see for instance section 3.3). We can then formulate the following
requirement on automata from Aut(L1):
(continuity) let a, b be states such that both a  b and b  a, and let c ∈ C; if Ω(b) = 1
then ∆(b, c) is continuous in a. If Ω(b) = 0, then ∆(b, c) is co-continuous in a.
For the automata used in this article we need to combine the constraints for the horizontal
and vertical dimensions, yielding automata with both the weakness and continuity constraints.
Definition 4.3 A continuous-weak parity automaton is an automaton A ∈ Aut(L1) addit-
tionally satisfying both the (weakness) and (continuity) conditions. We let Autcw(L1)
denote the class of such automata.
Observe that, so far, the continuity condition is given semantically. However, given that
the one-step languages that we are interested in have a syntactic characterization of continuity
(see for example Theorem 3.31) we will give concrete definitions of these automata that take
advantage of the mentioned characterizations.
Definition 4.4 A WMSO-automaton A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI 〉 is an automaton A ∈ Aut(FOE
∞
1 )
such that for all states a, b ∈ A with a  b and b  a the following conditions hold:
(weakness) Ω(a) = Ω(b),
(continuity) if Ω(a) is odd (resp. even) then, for each c ∈ C we have ∆(a, c) ∈ FOE∞1
+Cb(A)
(resp. ∆(a, c) ∈ FOE∞1
+Cb(A)).
As the class of such automata coincides with Autcw(FOE
∞
1 ) we use the same notation for it.
We have now arrived at the main theorem of this section, which takes care of one direction
of Theorem 1.2. The main theorem of this section states that
Theorem 4.5 There is an effective construction transforming a WMSO-formula ϕ into a
WMSO-automaton Aϕ that is equivalent to ϕ on the class of trees. That is, for any tree T,
Aϕ accepts T iff T |= ϕ. (10)
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As usual, the proof of this theorem proceeds by induction on the complexity of ϕ. For
the inductive steps of this proof, we need to verify that the class of WMSO-automata is
closed under the boolean operations and finite projection. Clearly, the latter closure property
requires most of the work; we first provide a simulation theorem that put WMSO-automata
in a suitable shape for the projection construction. The proofs in the next two sections are
(nontrivial) modifications of the analogous results proved in [5]. It will be convenient to use
the following terminology.
Definition 4.6 The tree language T (A) recognized by an automaton A is defined as the
collection of trees that are accepted by A. A class of trees is WMSO-automaton recognizable
(or recognizable, if clear from context), if it is of the form T (A) for a WMSO-automaton A.
4.1 Simulation theorem
In this section we show that any WMSO-automaton A can be simulated by a “two-sorted”
WMSO-automaton AF . The leading intuition is that AF will consist of one copy of A (based
on a set of states A) and a variant of its powerset construction, which will be based both
on states from A and “macro-states” from ℘(A × A).3 Successful runs of AF will have the
property of processing only a finite amount of the input with AF being in a macro-state and
all the rest with AF behaving exactly as A.
To achieve this result, we first need some preliminary definitions. The following is a
notion of lifting for types on states that is instrumental in defining a translation to types on
macro-states. The distinction between empty and non-empty subsets of A is to make sure
that empty types on A are lifted to empty types on ℘A.
Definition 4.7 Let A be a set of unary predicates. Given a set Σ ⊆ ℘A, its lifting is the set
Σ℘ ⊆ ℘℘A defined as follows:
Σ℘ := {{S} | S ∈ Σ ∧ S 6= ∅} ∪ {∅ | ∅ ∈ Σ}.
The next step is to define a translation on the sentences associated with the transition
function of the original WMSO-automaton, say with set of states A. Following the intuition
given above, the idea is that we want to work with sentences that can be made true by
assigning macro-states (from ℘(A × A)) to finitely many nodes in the model, and ordinary
states (from A) to all the other nodes. Henceforth, we use the notation A♯ for the set ℘(A×A).
Definition 4.8 Let ϕ ∈ FOE∞1
+(A × A) be a formula of shape ∇+FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) for some
Π,Σ ⊆ A♯ and
#–
T = {T1, . . . , Tk} ⊆ A
♯. Let Σ˜ ⊆ ℘A be Σ˜ := {Ran(S) | S ∈ Σ}. We define
ϕF ∈ FOE∞1
+(A ∪A♯) as follows:
(∇+FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ))F := ∇+FOE∞(
#–
T
℘
,Π℘ ∪Σ℘, Σ˜).
3It is customary for powerset constructions on parity automata to encode macro-states as binary relations
between states (from ℘(A×A)) instead of plain sets (from ℘A). Such additional structure is needed to correctly
associate with a run on macro-states the corresponding bundle of runs of the original automaton A. We refer
to the standard literature on parity automata (e.g. [23, 8]) for further details.
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Observe that each τ+P with P ∈ Σ˜ appearing in ϕ
F is a (positive) A-type, as P = Ran(S) ⊆ A
for some S ∈ Σ.
Our desiderata on the translation (·)F concern the notions of continuity and functionality.
Definition 4.9 Given a set A of unary predicates and B ⊆ A, we say that a sentence
ϕ ∈ FOE∞1
+(A) is functionally continuous in B if, for every model (D,V : A→ ℘(D)),
if (D,V ), g |= ϕ then ∃ V ′ : A→ ℘(D) such that (D,V ′), g |= ϕ,
V ′(a) ⊆ V (a) for all a ∈ A, (V ′ is a restriction of V )
V ′(b) is finite for all b ∈ B and (continuity in B)
V ′(b) ∩ V ′(a) = ∅ for all a ∈ A \ {b} and b ∈ B. (functionality in B)
In words, ϕ is functionally continuous in B if it is continuous in each b ∈ B and, for each
model (D,V ) where ϕ is true, there is a restriction V ′ of V which both witnesses continuity
and does not assign any other a ∈ A to the elements marked with some b ∈ B.
Lemma 4.10 Let ϕ ∈ FOE∞1
+(A × A) and ϕF ∈ FOE∞1
+(A ∪ A♯) be given as in Defini-
tion 4.8. Then ϕF is functionally continuous in A♯.
Proof. We first unfold the definition of ϕF as follows:
ϕF = ∃ #–x.
(
diff( #–x ) ∧
∧
0≤i≤n
τ+
T℘i
(xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ1
∧∀z.(diff( #–x , z)→
∨
S∈Π℘∪Σ℘∪Σ˜
τ+S (z))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ2
∧
∧
P∈Σ˜
∃∞y.τ+P (y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ3
∧∀∞y.
∨
P∈Σ˜
τ+P (y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ4
.
Observe that ψ1 ∧ ψ2 is just ∇
+
FOE(
#–
T
℘
,Π℘ ∪ Σ℘ ∪ Σ˜). Now suppose that (D,V : (A ∪A♯)→
℘(D)) is a model where ϕF is true. This amounts to the truth of subformulas ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 and
ψ4 whose syntactic shape yields information on the types of elements of D. In particular, we
can define a partition of D into subsets D1, D2, D
′
2 as follows:
• As ψ1 is true, we can pick n distinct elements s1, . . . , sn of D such that si witnesses the
positive type T℘i , that is, si ∈ V (S) for each S ∈ T
℘
i . We define D1 := {s1, . . . , sn}.
• As ψ2 is true, we can cover all the elements not in D1 with two disjoint sets D2 and D
′
2
given as follows. The set D2 is defined to contain all the elements not in D1 witnessing
a type τ+P (z) with P ∈ Σ˜. The set D
′
2 is just the complement of D1 ∪D2: by syntactic
shape of ψ2, all elements of D
′
2 witness a positive type τ
+
S with S ∈ Π
℘ ∪ Σ℘.
• The truth of the subformula ψ4 yields the information that the set D1 ∪D
′
2 is finite. If
Σ˜ is non-empty, the truth of ψ3 implies that the set D2 is infinite.
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This partition uniquely associates with each s ∈ D a type τ+S witnessed by s and thus a set
of unary predicates Ss := S ⊆ A ∪ A
♯. We can then define a valuation V ′ assigning to each
element s of D exactly the set Ss.
We now check the properties of V ′. As the partition inducing V ′ follows the syntactic
shape of ϕF , one can observe that V ′ is a restriction of V and (D,V ′) makes ϕF true. By
definition of the partition, V ′ assigns unary predicates from A♯ only to elements in the finite
set D1∪D
′
2, meaning that ϕ
F is continuous in A♯. Furthermore, V ′ assigns at most one unary
predicate from A♯ to each element of D1 ∪D
′
2, because
#–
T
℘
∪Π℘ ∪Σ℘ is defined as the lifting
of
#–
T ∪Π∪Σ. It follows that ϕF is also functional in A♯. Since the same restriction V ′ yields
both properties, ϕF is functionally continuous in A♯. qed
Remark 4.11 As ϕF is of shape ∇+FOE∞(
#–
T
℘
,Π℘ ∪Σ℘, Σ˜) with R 6∈
⋃
Σ˜ for each R ∈ A♯, by
application of Corollary 3.34 we would immediately get that ϕF is continuous in each R ∈ A♯.
However, we do not use this observation in proving Lemma 4.10 and propose instead a more
direct argument, allowing to show both continuity and functionality at once. ✁
The next definition is standard (see e.g. [23, 22]) as an intermediate step to define the
transition function of the powerset construct for parity automata.
Definition 4.12 Let A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 be a WMSO-automaton. Fix a ∈ A and c ∈ C. The
sentence ∆⋆(a, c) is defined as
∆⋆(a, c) := ∆(a, c)[b 7→ (a, b) | b ∈ A].
Next we combine the previous definitions to characterize the transition function associated
with the macro-states.
Definition 4.13 Let A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI 〉 be a WMSO-automaton. Let c ∈ C be a label and
Q ∈ A♯ a binary relation on A. By Corollary 3.26, for some Π,Σ ⊆ A♯ and Ti ⊆ A×A, there
is a sentence ΨQ,c ∈ FOE
∞
1
+(A×A) in the basic form
∨
∇+FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) such that∧
a∈Ran(Q)
∆⋆(a, c) ≡ ΨQ,c.
By definition ΨQ,c is of the form
∨
i ϕi, with each ϕi of shape ∇
+
FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ). We put
∆♯(Q, c) :=
∨
i ϕ
F
i , where the translation (·)
F is given as in definition 4.8. Observe that
∆♯(Q, c) is of type FOE∞1
+(A ∪A♯).
We have now all the ingredients to define our two-sorted automaton.
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Definition 4.14 Let A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 be a WMSO-automaton. We define the finitary
construct over A as the automaton AF = 〈AF ,∆F ,ΩF , aFI 〉 given by
AF := A ∪A♯
aFI := {(aI , aI)}
∆F (a, c) := ∆(a, c)
∆F (R, c) := ∆♯(R, c) ∨
∧
a∈Ran(R)
∆(a, c)
ΩF (a) := Ω(a)
ΩF (R) := 1.
The underlying idea of Definition 4.14 is the same of the two-sorted construction (cf. [24,
Def. 3.7], [5]) for weak MSO-automata. In both cases we want that macro-states process just
a well-founded portion of any accepted tree: this is guaranteed by associating all macro-states
with the odd parity value 1. However, for the finitary construction we aim at the stronger
condition that such a portion is finite. To achieve this, the key difference with the two-sorted
construction is in the use of the translation (·)F to define ∆♯: as ∆ may be specified using
quantifiers ∃∞ and ∀∞, it serves the purpose of tracking the cardinality constraints of the
original WMSO-automaton and ensure that they are not lifted to constraints on macro-states.
The next proposition establishes the desired properties of the finitary construct. To this
aim, we first introduce the notions of functional and finitary strategy.
Definition 4.15 Given a WMSO-automaton A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 and transition system T, a
strategy f for ∃ in A(A,T) is functional in B ⊆ A (or simply functional, if B = A) if for each
node s in T there is at most one b ∈ B such that (b, s) is a reachable position in an f -guided
match. Also f is finitary in B if there are only finitely many nodes s in T for which a position
(b, s) with b ∈ B is reachable in an f -guided match.
Lemma 4.16 Let A be a WMSO-automaton and AF its finitary construct over A. The
following holds:
1. AF is a WMSO-automaton.
2. For any T, if ∃ has a winning strategy in the game A(AF ,T)@(aFI , sI), then she has a
winning strategy in the same game which is both functional and finitary in A♯.
3. A ≡ AF .
Proof. We address each point separately.
1. We need to show that AF is weak and respects the continuity condition. For this
purpose, we fix the following observation:
(⋆) by definition of ∆F , for any macro-state R ∈ A♯ and state a ∈ A, it is never the
case that a  R.
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This means that, when considering a strongly connected component of AF , we may
assume that all states involved are either from A or from A♯.
In order to prove our claim, let q1, q2 ∈ A
F be two states of AF such that q1  q2 and
q2  q1. By observation (⋆), we can distinguish the following two cases:
(i) if q1 and q2 are states from A, then for i ∈ {1, 2} the value of Ω
F (qi) and ∆
F (qi, c)
is defined respectively as Ω(qi) and ∆(qi, c) like in the WMSO-automaton A. It
follows that they satisfy both the continuity and weakness condition.
(ii) Otherwise, q1 and q2 are macro-states in A
♯. For the weakness condition, observe
that all macro-states in AF have the same parity value. For the continuity condi-
tion, suppose that q1 occurs in ∆
F (q2, c) for some c ∈ C. By definition q1 can only
appear in the disjunct ∆♯(q2, c) =
∨
i ϕ
F
i of ∆
F (q2, c). By Lemma 4.10, we know
that each ϕFi is continuous in A
♯. Then in particular ∆F (q2, c) is continuous in
q1. By definition Ω
F (q1) = 1 is odd, meaning that the continuity condition holds.
The case in which q2 appears in ∆
F (q1, c) is just symmetric.
2. Let f be a winning strategy for ∃ in A(AF ,T)@(aFI , sI). We define a strategy f
′ for ∃
in the same game as follows:
(a) on basic positions of the form (a, s) ∈ A× T , let V be the valuation suggested by
f . We let the valuation suggested by f ′ be the restriction V ′ of V to A. Observe
that, as no predicate from AF \ A = A♯ occurs in ∆F (a, σ(s)) = ∆(a, σ(s)), then
V ′ also makes that sentence true in R[s].
(b) for basic positions of the form (R, s) ∈ A♯ × T , let VR,s be the valuation suggested
by f . As f is winning, ∆F (R,σ(s)) is true in the model VR,s. If this is because
the disjunct
∧
a∈Ran(R)∆(a, σ(s)) is made true, then we can let f
′ suggest the
restriction to A of VR,s, for the same reason as in (a). Otherwise, the disjunct
∆♯(R,σ(s)) =
∨
i ϕ
F
i is made true. This means that, for some i,
(R[s], VR,s) |= ϕ
F
i .
By Lemma 4.10 ϕFi is functionally continuous in A
♯, meaning that we have a
restriction V ′R,s of VR,s that verifies ϕ
F
i , assigns finitely many nodes to predicates
from A♯ and associates with each node at most one predicate from A♯. We let V ′R,s
be the suggestion of f ′ from position (R, s).
The strategy f ′ defined as above is immediately seen to be surviving for ∃. It is also
winning, because the set of basic positions on which f ′ is defined is a subset of the one
of the winning strategy f . By this observation it also follows that any f ′-conform match
visits basic positions of the form (R, s) ∈ A♯×C only finitely many times, as those have
odd parity. By definition, the valuation suggested by f ′ only assigns finitely many nodes
to predicates in A♯ from positions of that shape, and no nodes from other positions.
It follows that f ′ is finitary in A♯. Functionality in A♯ also follows immediately by
definition of f ′.
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3. The proof is entirely analogous to the one presented in [24, Prop. 3.9] for the two-
sorted construction. For the direction from left to right, it is immediate by definition
of AF that a winning strategy for ∃ in G = A(A,T)@(aI , sI) is also winning for ∃ in
GF = A(AF ,T)@(aFI , sI).
For the direction from right to left, let f be a winning strategy for ∃ in GF . The idea is
to define a strategy f ′ for ∃ in stages, while playing a match π′ in G. In parallel to π′,
a shadow match π in GF is maintained, where ∃ plays according to the strategy f . For
each round zi, we want to keep the following relation between the two matches:
Either
(1) basic positions of the form (Q, s) ∈ A♯×T and (a, s) ∈ A×T occur
respectively in π and π′, with a ∈ Ran(Q),
or
(2) the same basic position of the form (a, s) ∈ A × T occurs in both
matches.
(‡)
The key observation is that, because f is winning, a basic position of the form (Q, s) ∈
A♯ × T can occur only for finitely many initial rounds z0, . . . , zn that are played in π,
whereas for all successive rounds zn, zn+1, . . . only basic positions of the form (a, s) ∈
A×T are encountered. Indeed, if this was not the case then either ∃ would get stuck or
the minimum parity occurring infinitely often would be odd, since states from A♯ have
parity 1.
It follows that enforcing a relation between the two matches as in (‡) suffices to prove
that the defined strategy f ′ is winning for ∃ in π′. For this purpose, first observe that
(‡).1 holds at the initial round, where the positions visited in π′ and π are respectively
(aI , sI) ∈ A×T and ({(aI , aI)}, sI) ∈ A
F ×T . Inductively, consider any round zi that is
played in π′ and π, respectively with basic positions (a, s) ∈ A×T and (q, s) ∈ AF ×T .
In order to define the suggestion of f ′ in π′, we distinguish two cases.
• First suppose that (q, s) is of the form (Q, s) ∈ A♯×T . By (‡) we can assume that
a is in Ran(Q). Let VQ,s : A
F → ℘(R[s]) be the valuation suggested by f , verifying
the sentence ∆F (Q,σ(s)). We distinguish two further cases, depending on which
disjunct of ∆F (Q,σ(s)) is made true by VQ,s.
(i) If (R[s], VQ,s) |=
∧
b∈Ran(Q)∆(b, σ(s)), then we let ∃ pick the restriction to A
of the valuation VQ,s.
(ii) If (R[s], VQ,s) |= ∆
♯(Q,σ(s)), we let ∃ pick a valuation Va,s : A → ℘(R[s])
defined by putting, for each b ∈ A:
Va,s(b) :=
⋃
b∈Ran(Q′)
{t ∈ R[s] | t ∈ VQ,s(Q
′)}
∪ {t ∈ R[s] | t ∈ VQ,s(b)}.
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It can be readily checked that the suggested move is admissible for ∃ in π, i.e. it
makes ∆(a, σ(s)) true in R[s]. For case (ii), one has to observe how ∆♯ is defined
in terms of ∆. In particular, the nodes assigned to b by VQ,s have to be assigned
to b also by Va,s, as they may be necessary to fulfill the condition, expressed with
∃∞ and ∀∞, that infinitely many nodes witness (or that finitely many nodes do
not witness) some type.
We now show that (‡) holds at round zi+1. If (i) is the case, any next position
(b, t) ∈ A×T picked by player ∀ in π′ is also available for ∀ in π, and we end up in
case (‡.2). Suppose instead that (ii) is the case. Given the choice (b, t) ∈ A× T of
∀, by definition of Va,s there are two possibilities. First, (b, t) is also an available
choice for ∀ in π, and we end up in case (‡.2) as before. Otherwise, there is some
Q′ ∈ A♯ such that b is in Ran(Q′) and ∀ can choose (Q′, t) in the shadow match
π. By letting π advance at round zi+1 with such a move, we are able to maintain
(‡.1) also in zi+1.
• In the remaining case, inductively we are given the same basic position (a, s) ∈ A×
T both in π and in π′. The valuation V suggested by f in π verifies ∆F (a, σ(s)) =
∆(a, σ(s)), thus we can let the restriction of V to A be the valuation chosen by ∃
in the match π′. It is immediate that any next move of ∀ in π′ can be mirrored
by the same move in π, meaning that we are able to maintain the same position
–whence the relation (‡.1)– also in the next round.
In both cases, the suggestion of strategy f ′ was a legitimate move for ∃ maintaining the
relation (‡) between the two matches for any next round zi+1. It follows that f
′ is a
winning strategy for ∃ in G.
qed
Remark 4.17 While the finitary construction is a variant of the two-sorted one given in [5],
it is worth noticing that the latter would have not been suitable for our purposes. Indeed,
suppose to define the two-sorted construct A2S over a WMSO-automaton A, analogously
to the case of weak MSO-automata. Then A2S will generally not be a WMSO-automaton.
The problem lies in the (continuity) condition: since all macro-states in A2S have parity 1,
whenever two of them, say R and Q, are such that R  Q and Q  R, then the sentence
∆2S(R, c) should be continuous in Q. But this is not necessarily the case, since the truth
of ∆2S(R, c) may depend upon the truth of a subformula of the form ∃∞x.Q(x), requiring
Q to be interpreted over infinitely many nodes. (This problem is overcome in the finitary
construction by using the translation (·)F to define ∆F .)
As a consequence, we cannot use the two-sorted construction to show that WMSO-
automata are closed under noetherian projection ([5, Def. 3]). This observation is coherent
with the fact that WFMSO is not a fragment of WMSO. Similarly, the simulation theorem
for MSO-automata [23] preserves neither the (weakness) nor the (continuity) condition
and thus it cannot show closure under (arbitrary) projection for WMSO-automata. ✁
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4.2 Closure Properties
In this subsection we prove that WMSO-automata are closed under the operations corre-
sponding to the connectives of MSO, that is: union, complementation and projection with
respect to finite sets. We start with the latter.
4.2.1 Closure under Finitary Projection
Definition 4.18 Let A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 be a WMSO-automaton on alphabet ℘(P∪ {p}). Let
A
F denote its finitary construct. We define the automaton ∃F p.A = 〈A
F , aFI , ∆˜,Ω
F 〉 on
alphabet ℘P by putting
∆˜(a, c) := ∆F (a, c)
∆˜(R, c) := ∆F (R, c) ∨∆F (R, c ∪ {p}).
The automaton ∃F p.A is called the finitary projection construct of A over p.
Our projection construction corresponds to a suitable closure operation on tree languages,
modeling the semantics of WMSO existential quantification.
Definition 4.19 Let p be a propositional letter and L a tree language of ℘(P∪ {p})-labeled
trees. The finite projection of L over p is the language ∃F p.L of C-labeled trees defined as
∃Fp.L = {T | there is a p-variant T[p 7→ S] of T such that T[p 7→ S] ∈ L and S is finite}.
Lemma 4.20 For each WMSO-automaton A on alphabet ℘(P ∪ {p}), we have that
T (∃F p.A) ≡ ∃Fp.T (A).
Proof. What we need to show is that for any tree T:
∃Fp.A accepts T iff there is a finite p-variant T
′
of T such that A accepts T′.
For direction from left to right, we first observe that the properties stated by Lemma 4.16
hold for ∃F p.A as well, since the latter is defined in terms of A
F . Then we can assume that
the given winning strategy f for ∃ in G∃ = A(∃Fp.A,T)@(a
F
I , sI) is functional and finitary
in A♯. Functionality allows us to associate with each node s either none or a unique state
Qs ∈ A
♯ (cf. [24, Prop. 3.12]). We now want to isolate the nodes that f treats “as if they
were labeled with p”. For this purpose, let Vs be the valuation suggested by f from a position
(Qs, s) ∈ A
♯ × T . As f is winning, Vs makes ∆˜(Q,σ(s)) true in R[s]. We define a p-variant
T
′ of T by coloring with p all nodes in the following set:
Xp := {s ∈ T | (R[s], V˜s) |= ∆
F (Qs, σ(s) ∪ {p})}. (11)
The fact that the strategy of ∃ is finitary in A♯ guarantees that Xp is finite, whence T
′ is
a finite p-variant. The argument showing that AF (and thus also A, by Lemma 4.16(1))
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accepts T′ is a routine adaptation of the analogous proof for the noetherian projection of
weak MSO-automata, for which we refer to [24, Prop. 3.12].
For the direction from right to left, let T′ be a finite p-variant of T, with labeling function
σ′, and g a winning strategy for ∃ in G = A(A,T′)@(aI , sI). Our goal is to define a strategy
g′ for ∃ in G∃. As usual, g
′ will be constructed in stages, while playing a match π′ in G∃. In
parallel to π′, a bundle B of g-guided shadow matches in G is maintained, with the following
condition enforced for each round zi (cf. [24, Prop. 3.12]) :
1. If the current (i.e. at round zi) basic position in π
′ is of the form (Q, s) ∈
A♯ × T , then for each a ∈ Ran(Q) there is an g-guided (partial) shadow
match πa at basic position (a, s) ∈ A×T in the current bundle Bi. Also,
either T′s is not p-free (i.e., it does contain a node s
′ with p ∈ σ′(s′)) or
s has some sibling t such that T′t is not p-free.
2. Otherwise, the current basic position in π′ is of the form (a, s) ∈ A× T
and T′s is p-free (i.e., it does not contain any node s
′ with p ∈ σ′(s′)).
Also, the bundle Bi only consists of a single g-guided match πa whose
current basic position is also (a, s).
(‡)
We briefly recall the idea behind condition (‡). Point (‡.1) describes the part of match π′
where it is still possible to encounter nodes which are labeled with p in T′. As ∆˜ only takes
the letter p into account when defined on macro-states in A♯, we want π′ to visit only positions
of the form (R, s) ∈ A♯ × T in that situation. Anytime we visit such a position (R, s) in π′,
the role of the bundle is to provide one g-guided shadow match at position (a, s) for each
a ∈ Ran(R). Then g′ is defined in terms of what g suggests from those positions.
Point (‡.2) describes how we want the match π′ to be played on a p-free subtree: as any
node that one might encounter has the same label in T and T′, it is safe to let ∃Fp.A behave
as A in such situation. Provided that the two matches visit the same basic positions, of the
form (a, s)×A× T , we can let g′ just copy g.
The key observation is that, as T′ is a finite p-variant of T, nodes labeled with p are
reachable only for finitely many rounds of π′. This means that, provided that (‡) hold at each
round, (‡.1) will describe an initial segment of π′, whereas (‡.2) will describe the remaining
part. Thus our proof that g′ is a winning strategy for ∃ in G∃ is concluded by showing that
(‡) holds for each stage of construction of π′ and B.
For this purpose, we initialize π′ from position (a♯I , s) ∈ A
♯ × T and the bundle B as
B0 = {πaI }, with πaI the partial g-guided match consisting only of the position (aI , s) ∈ A×T .
The situation described by (‡.1) holds at the initial stage of the construction. Inductively,
suppose that at round zi we are given a position (q, s) ∈ A
F×T in πF and a bundle Bi as in (‡).
To show that (‡) can be maintained at round zi+1, we distinguish two cases, corresponding
respectively to situation (‡.1) and (‡.2) holding at round zi.
(A) If (q, s) is of the form (Q, s) ∈ A♯ × T , by inductive hypothesis we are given with g-
guided shadow matches {πa}a∈Ran(Q) in Bi. For each match πa in the bundle, we are
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provided with a valuation Va,s : A→ ℘(R[s]) making ∆(a, σ
′(s)) true. Then we further
distinguish the following two cases.
(i) Suppose first that T′s is not p-free. We let the suggestion V
′ : AF → ℘(R[s]) of g′
from position (Q, s) be defined as follows:
V ′(q′) :=

⋂
(a,b)∈q′,
a∈Ran(Q)
{t ∈ R[s] | t ∈ Va,s(b)} q
′ ∈ A♯
⋃
a∈Ran(Q)
{t ∈ R[s] | t ∈ Va,s(q
′) and T′.t is p-free} q′ ∈ A.
The definition of V ′ on q′ ∈ A♯ is standard (cf. [24, Prop. 2.21]) and guarantees a
correspondence between the states assigned by the markings {Va,s}a∈Ran(Q) and the
macro-states assigned by V ′. The definition of V ′ on q′ ∈ A aims at fulfilling the
conditions, expressed via ∃∞ and ∀∞, on the number of nodes in R[s] witnessing
(or not) some A-types. Those conditions are the ones that ∆♯(Q,σ′(s)) –and thus
also ∆F (Q,σ′(s))– “inherits” by
∧
a∈Ran(R)∆(a, σ
′(s)), by definition of ∆♯. Notice
that we restrict V ′(q′) to the nodes t ∈ Va,s(q
′) such that T′.t is p-free. As T′ is
a finite p-variant, only finitely many nodes in Va,s(q
′) will not have this property.
Therefore their exclusion, which is crucial for maintaining condition (‡) (cf. case
(a) below), does not influence the fulfilling of the cardinality conditions expressed
via ∃∞ and ∀∞ in ∆♯(Q,σ′(s)).
On the base of these observations, one can check that V ′ makes ∆♯(Q,σ′(s))–and
thus also ∆F (Q,σ′(s))–true in R[s]. In fact, to be a legitimate move for ∃ in π′,
V ′ should make ∆˜(Q,σ(s)) true: this is the case, for ∆F (Q,σ′(s)) is either equal
to ∆F (Q,σ(s)), if p 6∈ σ′(s), or to ∆F (Q,σ(s) ∪ {p}) otherwise. In order to check
that we can maintain (‡), let (q′, t) ∈ AF × T be any next position picked by ∀ in
π′ at round zi+1. As before, we distinguish two cases:
(a) If q′ is in A, then, by definition of V ′, ∀ can choose (q′, t) in some shadow
match πa in the bundle Bi. We dismiss the bundle –i.e. make it a singleton–
and bring only πa to the next round in the same position (q
′, t). Observe that,
by definition of V ′, T′.t is p-free and thus (‡.2) holds at round zi+1.
(b) Otherwise, q′ is in A♯. The new bundle Bi+1 is given in terms of the bundle
Bi: for each πa ∈ Bi with a ∈ Ran(Q), we look if for some b ∈ Ran(q
′) the
position (b, t) is a legitimate move for ∀ at round zi+1; if so, then we bring πa
to round zi+1 at position (b, t) and put the resulting (partial) shadow match
πb in Bi+1. Observe that, if ∀ is able to pick such position (q
′, t) in π′, then by
definition of V ′ the new bundle Bi+1 is non-empty and consists of an g-guided
(partial) shadow match πb for each b ∈ Ran(q
′). In this way we are able to
keep condition (‡.1) at round zi+1.
(ii) Let us now consider the case in which T′s is p-free. We let g
′ suggest the valuation
V ′ that assigns to each node t ∈ R[s] all states in
⋃
a∈Ran(Q){b ∈ A | t ∈ Va,s(b)}. It
can be checked that V ′ makes
∧
a∈Ran(Q)∆(a, σ
′(s)) – and then also ∆F (Q,σ′(s))
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– true in R[s]. As p 6∈ σ(s) = σ′(s), it follows that V ′ also makes ∆˜(Q,σ(s)) true,
whence it is a legitimate choice for ∃ in π′. Any next basic position picked by ∀
in π′ is of the form (b, t) ∈ A× T , and thus condition (‡.2) holds at round zi+1 as
shown in (i.a).
(B) In the remaining case, (q, s) is of the form (a, s) ∈ A× T and by inductive hypothesis
we are given with a bundle Bi consisting of a single f -guided (partial) shadow match
πa at the same position (a, s). Let Va,s be the suggestion of ∃ from position (a, s) in πa.
Since by assumption s is p-free, we have that σ′(s) = σ(s), meaning that ∆˜(a, σ(s)) is
just ∆(a, σ(s)) = ∆(a, σ′(s)). Thus the restriction V ′ of V to A makes ∆(a, σ′(t)) true
and we let it be the choice for ∃ in π˜. It follows that any next move made by ∀ in π˜
can be mirrored by ∀ in the shadow match πa.
qed
4.2.2 Closure under Boolean operations
In this section we will show that the class of WMSO-automaton recognizable tree languages
is closed under the Boolean operations. Start with closure under union, we just mention the
following result, without providing the (completely routine) proof.
Theorem 4.21 Let A0 and A1 be WMSO-automata. Then there is a WMSO-automaton A
such that T (A) is the union of T (A0) and T (A1).
In order to prove closure under complementation, we crucially use that the one-step lan-
guage FOE∞1 is closed under Boolean duals (cf. Proposition 3.38).
Theorem 4.22 Let A be an WMSO-automaton. Then the automaton A defined in Defini-
tion 2.6 is a WMSO-automaton recognizing the complement of T (A).
Proof. Since we already know that A accepts exactly the transition systems that are rejected
by A, we only need to check that A is indeed a WMSO-automaton. But this is straightforward:
for instance, continuity can be checked by observing the self-dual nature of this property. qed
4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Proof. The proof is by induction on ϕ.
• For the base case ϕ = p ⊑ q, the corresponding WMSO-automaton is provided in [24,
Ex. 2.6]. For the base case ϕ = R(p, q), we give the corresponding WMSO-automaton
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AR(p,q) = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 below:
A := {a0, a1}
aI := a0
∆(a0, c) :=
{
∃x.a1(x) ∧ ∀y.a0(y) if p ∈ c
∀x (a0(x)) otherwise
∆(a1, c) :=
{
⊤ if q ∈ c
⊥ otherwise
Ω(a0) := 0
Ω(a1) := 1.
Note that the MSO-automaton for R(p, q) provided in [24, Ex. 2.5] is not a WMSO-
automaton, as the continuity property does not hold.
• For the Boolean cases, where ϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 or ϕ = ¬ψ we refer to the closure properties
of recognizable tree languages, see Theorem 4.21 and Theorem 4.22, respectivel.
• For the case ϕ = ∃p.ψ, consider the following chain of equivalences, where Aψ is given
by the inductive hypothesis and ∃Fp.Aψ is constructed according to Definition 4.18:
∃Fp.Aψ accepts T iff Aψ accepts T[p 7→ X], for some X ⊆ω T (Lemma 4.20)
iff T[p 7→ X] |= ψ, for some X ⊆ω T (induction hyp.)
iff T |= ∃p.ψ (semantics WMSO)
qed
5 From WMSO-automata to WMSO
In what follows, we verify that WMSO-automata capture exactly the expressive power of
WMSO on the class of tree models. Since we already proved the direction from formulas into
automata (Theorem 4.5), we just have to verify that there is a sound translation going in the
other direction. For this purpose, we first introduce a fixpoint extension of first-order logic.
5.1 Fixpoint extension of first-order logic
Let our first-order signature be composed of a set P of monadic predicates (denoted with
capital latin letters) and an unique binary predicate R. Analogously to the modal µ-calculus,
the fixpoint extension of FOE∞(P) is defined by adding a fixpoint construction clause.
Definition 5.1 The fixed point logic µFOE∞(P) is given by:
ϕ ::= q(x) | R(x, y) | x ≈ y | ∃x.ϕ | ∃∞x.ϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | µp.ϕ(p, x)
where p, q ∈ P, x, y ∈ iVar; moreover p occurs only positively in ϕ(p, x) and x is the only free
variable in ϕ(p, x).
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The semantics of the fixpoint formula µp.ϕ(p, x)is the expected one. Given a model T and
s ∈ T , T |= µp.ϕ(p, s) iff s is in the least fixpoint of the operator Fϕ : ℘(T ) → ℘(T ) defined
as Fϕ(S) := {t ∈ T | T[p 7→ S] |= ϕ(p, t)}.
Formulas of µFOE∞ may be also classified according to their alternation depth as it hap-
pens for the modal µ-calculus. The alternation-free fragment of µFOE∞ is thence defined as
the collection of µFOE∞-formulas ϕ without nesting of greatest and least fixpoint operators,
i.e. such that, for any two subformulas µp.ψ1(p, y) and νq.ψ2(q, z), predicates p and q do not
occur free respectively in ψ2(q, z) and ψ1(p, y).
Definition 5.2 Given p ∈ P, we say that ϕ ∈ µFOE∞(P) is
• monotone in the predicate p iff for every LTS T and assignment g,
if T, g |= ϕ and σ♭(p) ⊆ E, then T[p 7→ E], g |= ϕ
• continuous in the predicate p iff for every LTS T and assignment g there exists some
finite S ⊆ω σ
♭(p) such that
T, g |= ϕ iff T[p 7→ S], g |= ϕ.
In the next definition, we provide a definition of the continuous fragment of µFOE∞,
reminiscent of the one defined in Theorem 3.31.
Definition 5.3 Let Q ⊆ P be a set of monadic predicates. The fragment µFOE∞CQ(P) is
defined by the following rules:
ϕ ::= ψ | q(x) | ∃x.ϕ(x) | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ |Wx.(ϕ,ψ) | µp.ϕ′(p, x)
where q ∈ Q, ψ ∈ µFOE∞(P \Q), p ∈ P \Q, Wx.(ϕ,ψ) := ∀x.(ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)) ∧ ∀∞x.ψ(x) and
ϕ′(p, x) is a formula with only x free such that ϕ′(p, x) ∈ µFOE∞CQ∪{p}(P).
Lemma 5.4 If ϕ ∈ µFOE∞CQ(P) then ϕ is continuous in (each predicate from) Q.
Proof. First, notice that If ϕ ∈ µFOE∞CQ(P) then ϕ is monotone in (each predicate from)
Q. The proof goes then by induction on the complexity of ϕ. For the all the cases except
the fixpoint one, the proof is the same as the one for Lemma 3.32. For ϕ = µp.ϕ′(p, x), with
ϕ′(p, x) ∈ µFOE∞CQ∪{p}(P), the argument is the same as in [6, Lemma 1]. qed
As for the modal µ-calculus, we define the fragment µcFOE
∞ of µFOE∞ as the one where
the use of the least fixed point operator is restricted to the continuous fragment.
Definition 5.5 The fragment µcFOE
∞(P) of µFOE∞(P) is given by the following restriction
of the fixpoint operator to the contiuous fragment:
ϕ ::= q(x) | R(x, y) | x ≈ y | ∃x.ϕ | ∃∞x.ϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | µp.ϕ′(p, x)
where p, q ∈ P, x, y ∈ iVar; and ϕ′(p, x) ∈ µFOE∞C{p}(P) is such that p occurs only positively
in ϕ′ and x is the only free variable in ϕ′.
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We now recall a useful property of fixpoint and continuity. Let ϕ(p, x) a formula with
only x free. Given a LTS T, for every ordinal α, we define by induction the following sets:
• ϕ0(∅) := ∅,
• ϕα+1(∅) := {s ∈ T | T[p 7→ ϕα(∅)] |= ϕ(p, s)},
• ϕλ(∅) :=
⋃
α<λ ϕ
α(∅), with λ limit.
If ϕ is monotone in p, it is possible to show that ϕβ+1(∅) = ϕβ(∅), for some ordinal β.
Moreover, the set ϕβ(∅) is the least fixpoint of Fϕ (cf. for instance [1]).
A formula ϕ(p, x) is said to be constructive in p if its least fixpoint is reached in at most
ω steps, i.e., if for every model T, the least fixpoint of Fϕ equals to
⋃
α<ω ϕ
α(∅). From a
local perspective, this means that a formula ϕ(p, x) constructive in p if for every model T,
every node s ∈ T , whenever µp.ϕ(p, x) is true at s, then s belongs to some finite approximant
ϕi+1(∅) of the least fixpoint of Fϕ. The next proposition is easily verified:
Proposition 5.6 Let ϕ(p, x) be a µFOE∞-formula with only x free. If ϕ(p, x) is continuous
in p, then for every LTS T, and every node s ∈ T , there is i < ω such that
T |= µp.ϕ(p, s) iff s ∈ ϕi+1(∅).
From the fact that sets ϕi+1(∅) are essentially defined as finite unfoldings and the previous
Proposition 5.6, we obtain the following.
Proposition 5.7 Let ϕ(p, x) be a µFOE∞-formula with only x free and such that ϕ(p, x) is
continuous in p. Let T be a LTS, and s ∈ T . Then T |= µp.ϕ(p, s) iff there is a finite set
pT ⊆ω T such that s ∈ p
T and T[p 7→ pT] |= ϕ(p, t) for every t ∈ pT.
Proof. For the direction from left to right, assume that T |= µp.ϕ(p, s). By Proposition 5.6,
we know that there is i < ω such that T[p 7→ ϕi(∅)] |= ϕ(p, s). The set ϕi(∅) need not to
be finite. However, using this information, we are going construct a finite tree whose nodes
t are labelled by finite sets Xmj , where m is a node of T and j ≤ i, satisfying the following
condition:
1. if t is the root, then t is labelled by Xsi ,
2. if t is labelled by Xmj = {s1, . . . , sℓ} and j > 0, then t has ℓ children and for every
si ∈ X
m
j there is an unique child t
′ of t labelled by Xnij−1 where m is a node,
3. for every node t of the tree, if t is labelled by Xmj , then it holds that X
m
j ⊆ ϕ
j(∅).
If we verify that T[p 7→ pT] |= ϕ(p, s) holds by taking as pT the union of all labels of the nodes
of the constructed tree, we can conclude for the proof of this direction.
As starting point of the inductive construction, we start by the empty tree. Recall that
we know that T[p 7→ ϕi(∅)] |= ϕ(p, s). Since ϕ(p, x) is continuous in p, there is a finite set
Xsi ⊆ ϕ
i(∅) such that T[p 7→ Xsi ] |= ϕ(p, s). We then add a root to our tree and label it
by Xsi . Assume that at a leaf s of our tree is labelled by X
m
j , for some j < i. If X
m
j is
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empty, than we stop, else we proceed as follows. We know that Xmj ⊆ ϕ
j(∅). This means
that T[p 7→ ϕj−1(∅)] |= ϕ(p, r), for every r ∈ Xmj . By continuity, for each such r, there is a
finite set Xmj−1 ⊆ ϕ
j−1(∅) such that T[p 7→ Xmj−1(∅)] |= ϕ(p, r). For each r ∈ X
m
j we thus add
a child to m and label it with Xrj−1. By definition of ϕ
i+1(∅), the tree is finite. Let X be the
union of all labels of the constructed tree. X is finite, and by monotonicity of ϕ(p, x) we have
that for every m ∈ X ∪ {s}, T[p 7→ X ∪ {s}] |= ϕ(p,m).
For the other direction, it’s enough to notice that the smallest finite set pT ⊆ T such that
T[p 7→ pT] |= ϕ(p, s) and T[p 7→ pT] |= ϕ(p,m) for all m ∈ pT is the least fixpoint Fϕ. qed
Proposition 5.7 naturally suggests the following translation (−)⋆ : µFOE∞(P)→WMSO(P),
• (p(x))⋆ = p(x),
• (R(x, y))⋆ = R(x, y)
• (x ≈ y)⋆ = (x ≈ y)
• (ϕ ∧ ψ)⋆ = (ϕ)⋆ ∧ (ψ)⋆,
• (¬ϕ)⋆ = ¬(ϕ)⋆,
• (∃x.ϕ)⋆ = ∃x.(ϕ)⋆,
• (∃∞x.ϕ)⋆ = ∀p.∃x.(¬p(x) ∧ (ϕ)⋆),
• (µp.ϕ(p, x))⋆ = ∃p(p(x) ∧ ∀y(p(y)→ (ϕ(p, y))⋆)).
The following theorem is then an immediate corollary of Proposition 5.7.
Theorem 5.8 For every alternation-free formula ϕ in the µcFOE
∞, every LTS T, and as-
signment g, we have T, g |= ϕ iff T, g |= (ϕ)⋆.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the complexity of ϕ, the only critical step being the
least fixpoint operator one. But this follows by applying Proposition 5.7 and the induction
hypothesis. qed
5.2 Translating automata into formulas
We are now ready to prove the second main result of the paper.
Theorem 5.9 There is an effective procedure that given an automaton in Autcw(FOE
∞
1 ),
returns an equivalent WMSO-formula.
Proof sketch. The argument is essentially a refinement of the standard proof showing that
any automaton in Aut(FO1) can be translated into an equivalent µ-formula ξA (cf. e.g. [22]).
The idea is the following. We see a WMSO-automaton as a system of equations expressed
in terms of FOE∞-formulas: each state corresponds to a monadic predicate variable and the
parity of a state corresponds to the least and greatest fixpoint that we seek for the associated
variable, etc. One then solves this system of equations via the same inductive procedure used
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to obtain the formula of the modal µ-calculus from the system associated with a Aut(FO1)-
automaton (see e.g. [1] for a description of the solution procedure). Because of the (weakness)
and (continuity) conditions on the starting WMSO-automaton A, it is thence possible to verify
that the resulting fixpoint formula ξA belongs to µcFOE
∞. qed
Remark 5.10 As a corollary of the automata characterization on trees of WMSO, we obtain
the equivalence on this class of structures between WMSO and µcFOE
∞. This consequence
should be compared to the analogous result obtained by Walukiewicz in [23] for FPL (fixpoint
extension of FOE) and MSO on trees. ✁
6 Modal Characterization of WMSO
In this section we are going to prove Theorem 1.2. Our proof of the first item of the theorem
crucially involves automata. In the previous section we saw that on trees, WMSO effectively
corresponds to the automata class Autcw(FOE
∞
1 ). We will now relate this class to the one of
parity automata based on FO1 and satisfying similar weakness and continuity conditions.
Definition 6.1 A µcML-automaton A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI 〉 is an automaton A ∈ Aut(FO1) such
that for all states a, b ∈ A with a  b and b  a the following conditions hold:
(weakness) Ω(a) = Ω(b),
(continuity) if Ω(a) is odd (resp. even) then, for each c ∈ C we have ∆(a, c) ∈ FO+1 Cb(A)
(resp. ∆(a, c) ∈ FO+1 Cb(A)).
As the class of such automata coincides with Autcw(FO1) we use the same name to denote it.
As the key technical result of our paper, in subsection 6.1 we will provide a construction
(−)• : Autcw(FOE
∞
1 )→ Autcw(FO1), such that for all A and T we have
A
• accepts T iff A accepts Tω, (12)
where Tω is the ω-unravelling of T. As we shall see, the map (−)• is completely determined
at the one-step level, that is, by some model-theoretic connection between FOE∞1 and FO1.
The second fact, to be discussed in subsection 6.2, is that for each µcML-automaton A we
can effectively construct an equivalent µcML-formula ξA.
On the basis of the above observations we show that those results are enough to prove
Theorem 1.2(i) as follows:
Proof of Theorem 1.2. (1) Given a WMSO-formula ϕ, let ϕ• := ξA•ϕ . We verify that
ϕ is bisimulation invariant iff ϕ and ϕ• are equivalent. The direction from right to left is
immediate by the observation that ϕ• is a formula in µML. The opposite direction follows
from the following chain of equivalences:
T |= ϕ iff Tω |= ϕ (ϕ bisimulation invariant)
iff Aϕ accepts T
ω (ϕ ≡ Aϕ on trees)
iff A•ϕ accepts T (12)
iff T |= ξA•ϕ (A
•
ϕ ≡ ξA•ϕ)
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(2) For the second part of Theorem 1.2, We first define, for every first-order variable x, a
translation STx from the µ-calculus into the set of µFOE
∞-formulas with only x free:
• STx(p) = p(x)
• STx(ϕ ∧ ψ) = STx(ϕ) ∧ STx(ψ),
• STx(ϕ ∨ ψ) = STx(ϕ) ∨ STx(ψ),
• STx(¬ϕ) = ¬STx(ϕ),
• STx(✸ϕ) = ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ STy(ϕ)),
• STx(µp.ϕ) = µp.STx(ϕ),
Clearly, every formula of the µcML-fragment of the µ-calclus is mapped to a logically equiv-
alent formula of the µcML-fragment of µFOE
∞. Let (−)• : µcML → WMSO defined as the
composite (−)⋆ ◦ STx. By Theorem 5.8 we obtain that ψ ≡ ψ•, for all ψ ∈ µcML. qed
6.1 One-step translations
In this subsection we will define a construction that transforms an arbitrary automaton A
in Autcw(FOE
∞
1 ) into an automaton A
• in Autcw(FO1), such that A and A
• are related
as in (12). This construction is completely determined by the following translation at the
one-step level.
Definition 6.2 Using the fact that by Corollary 3.26, any formula in FOE∞1
+(A) is equiv-
alent to a disjunction of formulas of the form ∇+FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ), we define the translation
(−)• : FOE∞1
+(A)→ FO+1 (A) as follows. We set(
∇+FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ)
)•
:=
∧
i
∃xi.τ
+
Ti
(xi) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ
τ+S (x)
and for α =
∨
i αi we define α
• :=
∨
α•i .
The key property of this translation is the following.
Proposition 6.3 For every one-step model (D,V ) and every α ∈ FOE∞1
+(A) we have
(D,V ) |= α• iff (D × ω, Vπ) |= α, (13)
where Vπ is the induced valuation given by Vπ(a) := {(d, k) | d ∈ V (a), k ∈ ω}.
Proof. Clearly it suffices to prove (13) for formulas of the form α = ∇+FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ).
⇒ Assume (D,V ) |= α•, we will show that (D × ω, Vπ) |= ∇
+
FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ). Let di be such
that τ+Ti(di) in (D,V ). It is clear that the (di, i) provide distinct elements satisfying τ
+
Ti
((di, i))
in (D×ω, Vπ) and therefore the first-order existential part of α is satisfied. With a similar but
easier argument it is straightforward that the existential generalized quantifier part of α is
also satisfied. For the universal parts of ∇+FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ) it is enough to observe that, because
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of the universal part of α•, every d ∈ D realizes a positive type in Σ. By construction, the
same applies to (D × ω, Vπ), therefore this takes care of both universal quantifiers.
⇐ Assuming that (D × ω, Vπ) |= ∇
+
FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ), we will show that (D,V ) |= α•. The
existential part of α• is trivial. For the universal part we have to show that every element
of D realizes the positive part of a type in Σ. Suppose not, and let d ∈ D be such that
¬τ+S (d) for all S ∈ Σ. Then we have (D × ω, Vπ) 6|= τ
+
S ((d, k)) for all k. That is, there are
infinitely many elements not realizing the positive part of any type in Σ. Hence we have
(D × ω, Vπ) 6|= ∀
∞y.
∨
S∈Σ τ
+
S (y). Absurd, because that is part of ∇
+
FOE∞(
#–
T ,Π,Σ). qed
As a consequence of Proposition 6.3 we obtain the following.
Definition 6.4 Given an automaton A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 in Aut(FOE
∞
1 ), define the automaton
A
• := 〈A,∆•,Ω, aI〉 in Aut(FO1) by putting, for each (a, c) ∈ A× C:
∆•(a, c) := (∆(a, c))•.
Proposition 6.5 For any automaton A = 〈A,∆,Ω, aI〉 in Aut(FOE
∞
1 ), and any model T, A
and T satisfy (12).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is based on a fairly routine comparison of the acceptance
games A(A•,T) and A(A,Tω). In a slightly more general setting, the details of this proof can
be found in [21]. qed
It remains to be checked that the construction (−)•, which has been defined for arbitrary
automata in Aut(FOE∞1 ), transforms WMSO-automata into automata in the right class, viz.,
Autcw(FO1).
Proposition 6.6 Let A ∈ Aut(FOE∞1 ). If A ∈ Autcw(FOE
∞
1 ), then A
• ∈ Autcw(FO1).
Proof. This proposition can be verified by a straightforward inspection, at the one-step level,
that if a formula α ∈ FOE∞1
+(A) belongs to the fragment FOE∞1
+Ca(A), then its translation
α• lands in the fragment FO+1 Ca(A). qed
Remark 6.7 As a corollary of the previous two propositions we find that
• Aut(FO1) ≡ Aut(FO1)/↔, and
• Autcw(FO1) ≡ Autcw(FO1)/↔.
In fact, we are dealing here with an instantiation of a more general phenomenon that is
essentially coalgebraic in nature. In [21] it is proved that if L1 and L
′
1 are two one-step
languages that are connected by a translation (−)• : L′1 → L1 satisfying a condition similar
to (13), then we find that Aut(L1) corresponds to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of
Aut(L′1): Aut(L1) ≡ Aut(L
′
1)/↔. This subsection can be generalized to prove similar results
relating Autw(L1) to Autw(L
′
1), and Autcw(L1) to Autcw(L
′
1). ✁
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6.2 From automata in Aut cw(FO1) to formulas in µcML
In this subsection we focus on the following theorem.
Theorem 6.8 There is an effective procedure that, given an automaton A in Autcw(FO1),
returns an equivalent formula ξA of the fragment µcML of the modal µ-calculus.
Proof. The argument is a refinement of the standard proof showing that any automaton A
from Aut(FO1) can be translated into an equivalent µ-formula ξA (cf. e.g. [22]), and it is
essentially a special case of the argument proving Theorem 5.9.
From now on, we always assume that a formula ∆(a, c) is in normal form. Following [22],
we introduce another type of automata, called (P,X)-automata, which operate on ℘(P ∪X)-
trees. They differ from automata whose one-step language is defined over predicates in (A∪X)
in that4
• Monadic predicate letters from X can occur in the scope of a quantifier and only there,
meaning that (P,X)-automata have transition ∆(a, c) ∈ FO+1 (A ∪X)
• The transition function is uniquely determined by the restriction of the coloring to P,
that is, for every a ∈ A, and c1, c2 ∈ C, if c1 ∩ P = c2 ∩ P then ∆(a, c1) = ∆(a, c2).
We also assume that for every x ∈ X there is a unique a ∈ A and an unique c ∈ C such that
x occurs in ∆(a, c). The notion of acceptance is defined as expected, the only difference with
being that during the acceptance game E´loise has to provide a valuation only for predicates
in A making formula given by the transition function true. It is then enough to prove the
following claim.
Claim 1 There is an effective procedure that, given a (P,X)-automaton A gives an equivalent
formula ξA ∈ µcML in which all occurrences of variables in X are positive.
Proof of Claim. Without loss of generality, we can assume that:
• Every (maximal) strongly connected component (SCC) in the graph of  has an unique
entrance point,
• The directed acyclic graph (DAG) of the SCCs of  is a tree, and more specifically,
• {c ∈ A | a❀ c, c ≺ a} ∩ {c ∈ A | b❀ c, c ≺ b} = ∅ whenever a, b are in the same SCC,
with a 6= b.
Given a (P,X)-automaton A, we are now going to define a function δA : A→ ML(A∪X∪P)
that assigns to each state a of A a modal formula δA(a) over A∪X∪P representing all possible
transitions from a in the modal language with the property that if b ∈ A is in the same -cycle
of a and Ω(a) = 1, then δA(a) is continuous in b. Dually for Ω(a) = 0.
Let c ∈ C, and assume ∆(a, c) is in positive basic form
∨
∇+FO(Σ). We define a first
translation TR1 taking as argument ∆(a, c) and giving as result a formula from the (guarded
fragment of) first-order logic over A ∪X ∪ P as follows. With every disjunct
∇+FO(Σ) =
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τ+S (x) ∧ ∀z.(
∨
S∈Σ
τ+S (z)),
4Parity automata based on FO1 are thus simply (P, ∅)-automata.
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we associate the formula
TR1(∇
+
FO(Σ)) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃y.(R(x, y) ∧ τ+S (y)) ∧ ∀z.(R(x, z)→
∨
S∈Σ
τ+S (z)).
The formula TR1(∇
+
FO(Σ)) is bisimulation invariant, and it is equivalent to the modal formula
TR2(∇
+
FO(Σ)) :=
∧
S∈Σ
✸(
∧
S) ∧ ✷
∨
S∈Σ
(
∧
S).
Let TR3(∆(a, c)) =
∧
(c ∩ P) ∧
∧
p∈P\c ¬p ∧
∨
TR2(∇
+
FO(Σ)). The modal formula δA(a) is
then defined as ∨
c∈C
TR3(∆(a, c)).
By construction we have, for every T,
T[x 7→ sI ] |=
∨
c∈C
(
τ(c∩P)(y) ∧
∨
TR1(∇
+
FO(Σ))
)
iff T  δA(a).
A modal automaton over P is an automaton 〈A, δ,Ω, aI 〉 such that δ : A → ML
+(A), where
ML+(A) is the set of all modal formulas over propositions A ∪ P such that elements from A
appear only positively. The acceptance game associated with such an automaton and a tree T
is determined by the (symmetric) acceptance game defined according to the rules of Table 2.
This means that we can equivalently see the automaton A as a modal automaton 〈A, δA,Ω, aI〉
whose transition function satisfies the weakness and continuity conditions. Thus, from now
on we see A as the equivalent modal automaton we have just described.
Position Player Admissible moves Parity
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {(δA(a), s)} Ω(a)
(ψ1 ∨ ψ2, s) ∃ {(ψ1, s), (ψ2, s)} −
(ψ1 ∧ ψ2, s) ∀ {(ψ1, s), (ψ2, s)} −
(✸ϕ, s) ∃ {(ϕ, t) | t ∈ R[s]} −
(✷ϕ, s) ∀ {(ϕ, t) | t ∈ R[s]} −
(¬p, s) ∈ P× S and p /∈ σ(s) ∀ ∅ −
(¬p, s) ∈ P× S and p ∈ σ(s) ∃ ∅ −
(p, s) ∈ P× S and p ∈ σ(s) ∀ ∅ −
(p, s) ∈ P× S and p /∈ σ(s) ∃ ∅ −
Table 2: (Symmetric) acceptance game for modal automata
For the construction of ξA, we proceed by induction on the tree height of the DAG t of
SCC. If the height is 1, that is the DAG is a single point graph, we reason as follows. We
have two cases to consider: either the SCC is trivial (i.e. it consists of a single non looping
node), or not. In the first case, A = {aI} and A is equivalent to ξA := δA(aI).
For the second case, let us assume that Ω(aI) = 1, the case when it is 0 being, mutatis
mutandis, the same. Let A = {a0, . . . , aℓ}, and aI = aℓ. Since A is a weak modal automaton
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satisfying the continuity condition, given a, b ∈ A, if b occurs in δA(a), then b is only in the
scope of ✸ operator. We can now see the automaton A as a system of modal equations, and
by applying the standard inductive procedure solves this system of equations and construct
the least fixpoint formula ξA equivalent to A,
Here the key observation is that the weakness and continuity conditions on strongly con-
nected components of the automaton ensure that when we execute a single step in solving
the system of equations, we may work within the (syntactically) continuous fragment of the
modal µ-calculus. From this, we can deduce that ξA ∈ µcML. Clearly the procedure preserves
the polarity of each x ∈ X, meaning that all variables in X are positive in ξA.
For the induction step, assume the successors of the root of t are (n1, . . . , nℓ). For each
i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, let ai be the entrance point of the SCC of ni, and let Ai be the automaton A
but having as an initial state ai. If we do not consider the states that are not reachable by
ai, the DAG of the SCC of Ai is t.ni (the subtree of t starting at ni). Let Y = {a1, . . . , aℓ},
and M be the set of states of A that belong to the root of t. We assume X ∩ Y = ∅. The
structure
AM := 〈M, δA|M ,Ω|M , aI〉
is a (P,X ∪ Y )-automaton.
The inductive hypothesis applies to automata AM ,A1, . . . ,Aℓ. Thus we obtain fixpoint
formulas ξM , ξ1, . . . , ξℓ, the former taking free variables in P ∪ X ∪ Y , all the remaining in
P ∪X, equivalent to AM ,A1, . . . ,Aℓ respectively. Notice that:
• by induction hypothesis, ξM , ξ1, . . . , ξℓ ∈ µcML, every variable x ∈ X ∪ Y is positive in
each of those formulas (if x occurs in it),
• by construction, if x is free in ξi, then x is not bounded in ξM .
We can therefore deduce that ξA = ξM [a1 7→ ξ1, . . . , aℓ 7→ ξℓ] ∈ µcML, and that each variable
from X occurs positively in ξA.
We verify that T  ξM [a1 7→ ξ1, . . . , aℓ 7→ ξℓ] iff T ∈ T (A), for every model T. But this
follows by the following two facts:
1. T  ξM [a1 7→ ξ1, . . . , aℓ 7→ ξℓ] iff T[a1 7→ Jξ1K
T, . . . , aℓ 7→ JξℓK
T]  ξM ,
2. T ∈ T (A) iff T[a1 7→ JA1K
T, . . . , aℓ 7→ JAℓK
T] ∈ T (AM )
where JAiK
T := {s ∈ T | T.s ∈ T (Ai)}. ◭
This finishes the proof of Theorem. qed
7 Conclusions
Overview. In this work we have presented three main contributions. First, we proved
that the bisimulation-invariant fragment of WMSO is the fragment µcML of µML where the
application of the fixpoint operator µp is restricted to formulas that are continuous in p.
Our result sheds light on the relationship between MSO, WMSO and µML. In particular, it
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provides a positive answer to the question whether WMSO/↔ ≤ AFMC on trees of arbitrary
branching degree, left open in [5]. This may also be read as the statement that the formulas
that separate WMSO from MSO are not bisimulation invariant (and hence, irrelevant in the
sense mentioned in the introduction).
To achieve this result, we shaped WMSO-automata, a special kind of parity automata
satisfying additional continuity and weakness conditions, with transition map given by the
monadic logic FOE∞1 . Our second main contribution was to show that they characterize
WMSO on tree models.
As our third main contribution we gave a detailed model-theoretic analysis of the mono-
tone and continuous fragments of FOE∞1 . We provide strong normal forms and syntactic
characterizations that, besides being of independent interest, are critical for the development
of the aforementioned results.
Future work. A first line of research is directly inspired by the methods employed in this
work. WMSO-automata and µcML-automata are essentially obtained by imposing condi-
tions on the appropriate one-step logic L1 and transition structure of automata belonging to
Aut(L1). Following this approach, one could take aim at the automata-theoretic counterpart
of other fragments of the modal µ-calculus, like PDL, CTL or CTL∗.
Another direction of investigation is based on the observation that, from a topological
point of view, all WMSO-definable properties are Borel. Since we do not have examples of
Borel MSO-definable properties that are not WMSO-definable, is tempting to conjecture that
WMSO is the Borel fragment of MSO and analogously for µcML and µML.
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